Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism by Darmer, M. K. B.
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 12
Issue 2 Spring 2003 Article 3
Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in
an Age of Terrorism
M. K. B. Darmer
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Darmer, M. K. B. (2003) "Beyond Bin Laden and Lindh: Confessions Law in an Age of Terrorism," Cornell Journal of Law and Public
Policy: Vol. 12: Iss. 2, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol12/iss2/3
BEYOND BIN LADEN AND LINDH:
CONFESSIONS LAW IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM
M.K.B. Darmert
INTRODUCTION ............................................. 320
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CONFESSIONS LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES ..................................... 323
A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND BRAM ................. 323
B. THE PRE-EMINENCE OF THE DUE PROCESS
"VOLuNTARINESS" TEST ............................. 328
C. THE MIRANDA DECISION AND A RETURN TO THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT .................................. 338
D. THE COURT'S POST-MIRANDA JURISPRUDENCE ....... 342
II. THE APPLICATION OF MIRANDA TO SUSPECTS
QUESTIONED ABROAD .............................. 345
A. THE BIN LADEN CASE .............................. 345
B. THE IMPLICATION OF INTERPRETING MIRANDA AS
ONLY A TRIAL RIGHT ............................... 348
C. CREATING A FOREIGN INTERROGATION EXCEPTION TO
M IRANDA ........................................... 351
III. THE COURT'S POST-MIRANDA DUE PROCESS
JURISPRUDENCE: IMPLICATIONS IN THE
TERRORIST CASES ................................... 354
A. THE LINDH CASE .................................... 355
B. THE DE FACTO DILUTION OF DUE PROCESS .......... 357
C. THE COURT'S POST-MIRANDA TREATMENT OF
"COMPELLED STATEMENTS" UNDER THE DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE RATHER THAN THE SELF-INCRIMINATION
CLAUSE .............................................. 360
D. WAS LINDH'S STATEMENT INVOLUNTARY? DUE
PROCESS LIMITS ON CONFESSIONS IN AN AGE OF
TERROR .............................................. 363
E. THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE ........................ 370
CONCLUSION ................................................ 372
t Assistant Professor, Chapman University School of Law. J.D., Columbia University
School of Law, 1989; former Assistant United States Attorney, Southern District of New York.
I thank the Chapman University School of Law for a research stipend, Professor Yale Kamisar
for generously offering his wisdom and insights and commenting on an earlier draft, Professor
Mark Godsey for sharing his forthcoming article and offering helpful comments on mine,
Robert Maynes and Karl Triebel for research assistance, Rik Silverman for helpful editing,
and, most especially, Roman E. Darmer II, for enduring support and assistance. Any errors are
entirely my own.
320 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 12:319
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Bin Laden,' a federal district court suppressed
statements made abroad during the investigation of the 1998 bombings of
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, 2 holding, in essence, that the
suspect should have been given Miranda warnings. 3 In 2002, lawyers
for the "American Taliban,"4 John Walker Lindh, moved to suppress
statements made by their client after his capture in Afghanistan, alleging
violations of both his Miranda and due process rights.5 Both cases arose
shortly after the Supreme Court's decision in Dickerson v. United
States,6 which reaffirmed the continuing validity of Miranda v. Arizona.7
In Dickerson, the Court held unconstitutional Congress's efforts to over-
rule the controversial Miranda decision 8 through legislation, 9 passed
shortly after Miranda was decided, that used a "totality of the circum-
stances" test to determine a confession's admissibility.' o
1 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
2 Although Usama bin Laden (now more commonly referred to as Osama bin Laden)
was indicted and named the lead defendant in the case, he was never actually captured or tried
in connection with the embassy bombings. Bin Laden is, of course, most notorious for his
suspected role as mastermind of the terrorist events of September 11, 200!.
3 For a thorough discussion of the case, see Mark A. Godsey, Miranda's Final Frontier
- The International Arena: A Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal
for a New Miranda Exception Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703 (2002).
4 James Dao, U.S. Hopes American Taliban Will Tell All, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at
B3.
5 Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Suppress
Statements for Violations of His Fifth Amendment Rights (Miranda and Edwards), United
States v. Lindh, No. CR 02-37-A (E.D. Va. 2002); Defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion to Suppress Involuntary Statements, United States v. Lindh,
No. CR 02-37-A (E.D. Va. 2002) [hereinafter Involuntary Statements Mem.].
6 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
7 384 U.S. 436 (1966). But see Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("Those who understand the judicial process will appreciate that today's decision is not a
reaffirmation of Miranda, but a radical revision of the most significant element of Miranda (as
of all cases): the rationale that gives it a permanent place in our jurisprudence.").
8 See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 SuP. CT.
REV. 99, 99 (referring to Miranda as "highly controversial"); see also Louis Michael Seidman,
Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673, 674 & n.4 (1992) (noting that Miranda "generated
a backlash that has permanently affected the political alignment of the country" and was
"likely .. .a major factor" in the Nixon election of 1968).
9 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000).
10 See M.K.B. Darmer, Lessons from the Lindh Case: Public Safety and the Fifth
Amendment, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 241, 268 & n.198-99 (2002). As discussed more fully in that
article, the Supreme Court held in Dickerson that § 3501 essentially reinstated the due process
voluntariness test used by the Court before Miranda and thus failed to provide a "constitution-
ally adequate substitute for the Miranda warnings." Id. at 269 (citing Dickerson, 530 U.S. at
442-43).
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Obtaining confessions from suspected terrorists will play an integral
role in this country's current "war on terror."' I Yet as this article goes to
press, the news is full of confessions that have been shown to be false,
including those made by young men convicted in the notorious "Central
Park Jogger" case.' 2 Similarly, in a case involving an Egyptian national
detained as a material witness after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, the witness falsely confessed to owning a suspicious radio device
that was discovered in a hotel across the street from the former World
Trade Center.' 3 This article examines the current state of confessions
law in light of society's need for confessions and proposes specific ap-
proaches designed to serve the legitimate needs of law enforcement
while remaining true to the Constitution.' 4
Despite the fact that Dickerson settled the question of Miranda's
survival, at least in the near term, questions of the constitutional legiti-
macy of the original decision endure. Moreover, the Court's broader
confessions jurisprudence can perhaps best be described as incoherent.
Long before the Miranda decision, issues related to confessions bedev-
iled the courts. '5 Though Miranda itself replaced the former case-by-
I George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress, Sept. 20, 2001, available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html (using phrase "war on
terror").
12 See Susan Saulny, Convictions and Charges Voided in '89 Central Park Jogger At-
tack, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2002, at Al. But see Robert D. McFadden, Police Panel Says 5
Convicted Men Most Likely Raped Central Park Jogger, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2003, at A21.
(The Times subsequently published a correction to clarify its "imprecise[ ]" headline; the re-
port concluded that "the five were most likely guilty of having started an attack with sexual
overtones on the jogger, who was later raped and beaten by Mr. Reyes [the serial rapist whose
confession to acting alone caused the convictions against the five defendants to be vacated]. It
did not say they were most likely guilty in the rape itself." Correction, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29,
2003.)
13 See In re Application of the United States for Material Witness Warrant, 214 F. Supp.
2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) [hereinafter Material Witness Warrant]. The Egyptian national,
Abdallah Higazy, had entered the United States on a student visa on August 27, 2001, and
checked into the Millennium Hotel, located across from the World Trade Center. Id. at 357.
Higazy was still at the hotel on September 1I and was evacuated along with other guests. A
security guard at the hotel later advised the F.B.I. that a safe in Higazy's room contained his
passport, a copy of the Koran, and the radio, known as a transceiver, which is capable of being
used for "air-to-air and air-to-ground communication with persons in possession of a similar
radio." Id. at 358. It later turned out, however, that the radio was not used for nefarious
purposes and actually belonged to an American pilot staying at the same hotel as the Egyptian
national. Id. at 359. "Still further investigation revealed that the hotel security guard had
repeatedly lied to the F.B.I. in stating that he found the transceiver in the safe in Higazy's
room." Id.
14 This is my second of two articles dealing broadly with this topic. The first focused
specifically on John Walker Lindh's allegations involving violations of his Fifth Amendment
rights as interpreted by Miranda v. Arizona and Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
Darmer, supra note 10.
15 The Supreme Court has relied, variously, on the Fifth Amendment fight against self-
incrimination, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and the Due Process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth amendments in struggling with cases involving the admissibility of confessions
2003]
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case due process approach with a structure designed to be easier in appli-
cation, the Court continues to struggle with confessions cases. As dis-
cussed more fully, infra, the Court has carved out a number of exceptions
to Miranda and, in cases in which the Miranda requirements have been
fulfilled or do not apply, continues to use the case-by-case due process
approach as essentially a "backup" test.
While there are inherent difficulties in balancing the rights of crimi-
nal suspects with the legitimate goals of law enforcement, 16 these diffi-
culties are magnified in cases involving terrorism and national security.
Confessions may be critical to such cases, 17 and obtaining justice in
cases involving terrorism is of critical importance.
Part I of this article traces the development of confessions law in the
United States. It discusses the Supreme Court's early application of the
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause to a nineteenth-century con-
fessions case, its later focus on the Due Process Clause during a fertile
period of confessions law development between 1936 and 1964, and its
return to the Fifth Amendment as the anchor for its landmark decision in
Miranda v. Arizona. Part I then briefly addresses the current state of
confessions law after the Court's recent decision in Dickerson v. United
States, in which the Court putatively reaffirmed the "constitutional"
made under questionable circumstances. See Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897)
(finding confession coerced based on Fifth Amendment analysis); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322
U.S. 143 (1944) (relying on due process analysis in concluding that confession was involun-
tary); id. at 157 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority's due process analysis, in an
opinion joined by two other justices); Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (finding due
process violation); id. at 199 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (finding that majority opinion "oversteps
the boundary between this Court's function under the Fourteenth Amendment and that of the
state courts in the administration of state criminal justice," in an opinion joined by two other
justices); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (finding that interrogation violated Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, in a 5-4 decision); id. at 494 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (criticizing
Court for holding inadmissible a "voluntary" confession). See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Recon-
sidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 451 (1987) (noting that the "flexible," pre-Miranda
due process test "created numerous problems, not only for suspects facing interrogation, but
also for the courts and for the police"); id. ("difficulties of the due process approach remained"
even after Miranda shifted the Court's focus to the Fifth Amendment).
16 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959) ("As in all such [confession] cases,
we are forced to resolve a conflict between two fundamental interests of society; its interest in
prompt and efficient law enforcement, and its interest in preventing the rights of its individual
members from being abridged by unconstitutional methods of law enforcement."); Donald A.
Dripps, Constitutional Theory for Criminal Procedure: Dickerson, Miranda, and the Continu-
ing Quest for Broad-but-Shallow, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 53 (2001) ("There is wide-
spread agreement on achieving instrumental reliability in the criminal process. There is no
such agreement on the relative priority of public security and individual autonomy or
dignity.").
17 See William Glaberson, Whether Walker Knew of Counsel Is Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
17, 2002, at A17 (" 'The case against him is almost entirely based on his own statements,' said
H. Richard Uviller, a criminal law expert at Columbia Law School, 'so if those statements are
barred from court, there goes the case."'); see also Steven Brill, End of Their Rope, NEWs-
WEEK, Apr. 15, 2002, at 48 (emphasizing importance of confession to Lindh case).
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foundation of Miranda while, paradoxically, apparently leaving intact a
line of pre-Dickerson cases premised on the view that the Miranda warn-
ings were subconstitutional "prophylactic rules."
Part II then turns to the special issues raised by interrogation that
occurs outside the territorial limits of the United States. It takes a close
look at a district court's recent decision in United States v. Bin Laden,' 8
which held that the privilege against self-incrimination applied even to
nonresident aliens whose only connection to the United States was their
prosecution in this country for the bombing of the U.S. embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania. While I agree that the Self-Incrimination Clause
applies to aliens tried in United States courts, I do not agree that the
clause is implicated by a technical violation of Miranda when the confes-
sion is voluntary, and I propose a "foreign interrogation" exception to
Miranda.
Part III discusses the due process limits on custodial confessions, a
critical issue that was raised - but never resolved by the court - in the
Lindh case 19 and that inevitably will recur in future cases dealing with
terrorism and national security. Part Ill argues that evolving notions of
due process must take into account risks to national security but argues
that truly compelled statements should never be admitted into evidence.
It is those statements - rather than statements taken in technical viola-
tion of Miranda - that violate the Self-Incrimination Clause.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF CONFESSIONS LAW
IN THE UNITED STATES
A. THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND BRAM
The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. °20 The Self-
Incrimination Clause has been termed "an unsolved riddle of vast propor-
tions,"'2' and tracing the origin, meaning, and scope of the privilege is an
elusive task.22 Since the Supreme Court's 1966 Miranda decision, the
18 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
19 Lindh ultimately pleaded guilty to two felony charges carrying a prison sentence of
twenty years. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565 (E.D. Va. 2002); Plea Agreement,
United States v. Lindh, No. CR 02-37-A (E.D. Va. 2002); Neil A. Lewis, Admitting He Fought
in Taliban, American Agrees to 20-Year Term, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2002, at Al. The plea
was entered on the day that a hearing on Lindh's motions to suppress his statements was
scheduled to begin, meaning that the court never had to rule on the motions. See Scheduling
Order, Lindh (filed Feb. 15, 2002); see also Lewis, supra. For a further discussion of details of
Lindh's plea, see Darmer, supra note 10, at 253.
20 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
21 Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-
Incrimination Clause, 93 MICH. L. REV. 857, 857 (1995).
22 The task has been undertaken by others. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar
Privilege in Historical Perspective: The Right to Remain Silent, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2625
2003]
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Fifth Amendment has been associated with the right to refuse to answer
police questions, but that is a modern development, as police interroga-
tion itself is "a thoroughly modern phenomenon. '23
From well before the days of modem police forces, however, con-
fessions have been used to convict those suspected of crimes, and a body
of law developed governing the use of such evidence. 24 The degree to
which confessions doctrine and the constitutional right against self-in-
crimination were historically intertwined has been the focus of intense
scholarly debate,25 entry into which is beyond the scope of this article.
(1996); LEONARD L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT (1986); see also generally THE
PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (Richard H. Helm-
holz et al. eds., 1977); Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege
Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part 1), 53 OHIO
ST. L.J. 101 (1992), Lawrence Herman, The Unexplored Relationship Between the Privilege
Against Compulsory Self-Incrimination and the Involuntary Confession Rule (Part II), 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1992)
23 Steven Penney, Theories of Confession Admissibility: A Historical View, 25 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 310, 314 (1998).
24 See Laurence A. Benner, Requiem for Miranda: The Rehnquist Court's Voluntariness
Doctrine in Historical Perspective, 67 WASH. U. L.Q. 59, 92-101 (1989) (tracing history of
common-law voluntariness doctrine).
25 Wigmore's classic treatise on evidence has become associated with the view that
"there was no historical connection or association between the constitutional clause and the
confessions doctrine." 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 823, at 338 & n.5 (3d ed. 1970)
(noting that "[t]here has been much scholarly writing on the relationship between the confes-
sions rule and the privilege against self-incrimination"). Wigmore traces four "distinct stages"
in the history of confessions law. See id. § 817. The first stage includes the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, which is an era characterized by an uncritical acceptance of confessions
into evidence "without question as to their proceeding from promises or from fear of threats,
even of torture." Id. § 818, at 292. In the second stage, during the second half of the eight-
eenth century, "apparently untrustworthy" confessions were excluded, though confessions per
se were not viewed unfavorably and were considered to be compelling evidence of guilt. See
id. § 819, at 297. However, by the early part of the nineteenth century, "[t]here was a general
suspicion of all confessions, a prejudice against them as such, and an inclination to repudiate
them upon the slightest pretext." Id. § 820, at 297. Wigmore attributes this prejudice to pecu-
liarities of the English system, including features of its class system and limits of the English
judicial system in that era. See id. § 820a, at 298-300. In the fourth stage, Wigmore con-
cludes that the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected a policy favoring the reception of all "well-
proved confessions" into evidence. See id. § 820c, at 306 & n.5.
In his Pulitzer Prize-winning book, Origins of the Fifth Amendment, Leonard W. Levy
takes issue with Wigmore's claim regarding the essential separateness of the "rule against
involuntary confessions" and the "right against self-incrimination" (which, Levy notes, Wig-
more refers to merely as a "privilege"). According to Levy, "the nexus between the right
against self-incrimination and the rule against involuntary confessions emerged in the Parlia-
mentary debates in 1742." LEVY, supra note 22, at 328-29. In addition, he argues that "[t]he
history of the confessions rule in the eighteenth century and the present state of constitutional
law in the United States show the intimacy, not the opposition or differences, of the two rules."
Id. at 496 n.43. Levy's book provides an exhaustive historical account of the common-law
history of the rule against self-incrimination. However, he acknowledges that the scope and
meaning of the text of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is not self-evident:
Whether the framers of the Fifth Amendment intended it to be fully co-extensive
with the common law cannot be proved - or disproved. The language of the clause
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What is uncontroverted is that the U.S. Supreme Court did not rely
on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination as a basis for
evaluating the admissibility of confessions until its 1897 decision in
Bram v. United States.26 Before Brain, the Court used "reliability" as the
determining factor in admitting confessions, 27 though it couched its con-
cern with reliability in the language of "voluntariness." Confessions in-
duced by threats or promises were viewed as "involuntary" because
threats or promises might cause an innocent person to confess, yielding
an unreliable confession. 28 So long as such threats or promises were
absent, "[c]onfessions were admitted notwithstanding the fact that they
were obtained in custody, in the absence of counsel, and without prior
warnings of the right to silence or right to counsel. 29
In Bram,30 the Supreme Court shifted gears by relying explicitly on
the Fifth Amendment, though it again employed the language of "volun-
tariness. '31 Its concern for "voluntariness," however, went beyond tradi-
tional reliability concerns. The Court determined that to ascertain
whether Bram's confession was admissible under the Fifth Amendment,
it had to consider the confession's surrounding circumstances and the
nature of the detective's communication to Brain. First, "Bram had been
brought from confinement to the office of the detective, and there, when
alone with [the detective], in a foreign land, while he was in the act of
being stripped, or had been stripped, of his clothing, was interrogated by
and its framer's [sic] understanding of it may not have been synonymous. The diffi-
culty is that its framers . . . left too few clues. Nothing but passing explication
emerged during the process of state ratification of the Bill of Rights from 1789
through 1791. . . . That it was a ban on torture and a security for the criminally
accused were the most important of its functions, as had been the case historically,
but these were not the whole of its functions. Still, nothing can be found of a theo-
retical nature expressing a rationale or underlying policy for the right in question or
its reach.
Id. at 429-30. Lawrence Herman also argues that Wigmore's position is flawed. See Herman,
The Unexplored Relationship (Part I), supra note 22, at 105.
26 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
27 See Penney, supra note 23, at 325.
28 See id. (citing Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); Pierce v. United States, 160 U.S.
355 (1896)).
29 Id.
30 For a thorough discussion of the Bram case in historical context, see Benner, supra
note 24, at 101-13; Penney, supra note 23, at 326-30. See also JOSEPH D. GRANO, CoNFEs-
SIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 59 (1993); Leslie A. Lunney, The Erosion of Miranda: Stare
Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 730 (1999) (discussing the Supreme Court's
reliance on common law in cases decided before Bram).
31 The Court used the phrase "free and voluntary" and defined a "free and voluntary"
confession as one not extracted by force, threats, or violence, "nor by the exertion of any
improper influence"; in other words, free of coercion. The Court then proceeded to analyze
the confession before it, relying explicitly on the Fifth Amendment. Bram, 168 U.S. at 542-43
(internal citation omitted).
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the officer." 32 Second, in reviewing the interrogation, the Court consid-
ered the impression made upon Bram's mind. After Brain was told that
the only other suspect had accused him of the crime, "the result . . .
produce[d] upon his mind the fear that, if he remained silent, it would be
an admission of guilt . . . and . . . by denying, there was a hope of
removing the suspicion from himself."'33 The Court ruled that placing a
suspect in such circumstances, which "perturbs the mind and engenders
confusion of thought, '34 yields a confession that cannot truly be consid-
ered free of coercion.
The Bram case is illustrative in part because the circumstances sur-
rounding the interrogation were relatively tame, not only in terms of
prior cases, 35 but also in light of later confession cases that confronted
the Court. 36 If taken seriously, the language of Brain suggests that the
Fifth Amendment places extraordinary limits on the scope of permissible
interrogations. 37 In essence, "[t]he words of the detective which elicited
the allegedly incriminatory response from Bram were: 'Bram, we are
trying to unravel this horrible mystery' and '[y]our position is rather an
awkward one. I have had Brown in this office and he made a statement
that he saw you do the murder."' 38 This hardly amounts to the kind of
police pressure that later led the Court to formulate the Miranda rules.
32 Id. at 563.
33 Id. at 562. The detective testified about the conversation as follows:
When Mr. Brain came into my office, I said to him: "Bram, we are trying to unravel
this horrible mystery." I said: "Your position is rather an awkward one. I have had
Brown [the other suspect] in this office and he made a statement that he saw you do
the murder." He said: "He could not have seen me; where was he?" I said: "He
states he was at the wheel [of the ship]." "Well," he said, "he could not see me from
there." I said: "Now, look here, Bram, I am satisfied that you killed the captain from
all I have heard from Mr. Brown. But," I said, "some of us here think you could not
have done all that crime alone. If you had an accomplice, you should say so, and not
have the blame of this horrible crime on your own shoulders." He said: "Well, I
think, and many others on board the ship think, that Brown is the murderer; but I
don't know anything about it."
Id. at 539.
34 See id. at 564.
35 Indeed, Penney describes the decision as "a radical turn" taken by the Supreme Court.
Penney, supra note 23, at 326.
36 See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (holding that confession ex-
tracted through brutal means was barred by Due Process Clause).
37 According to Penney, although the Court "did not set out a clear, bright line rule as to
what kinds of inducements would be considered improper in future cases," it "intimated, how-
ever, that restrictions on the police would be stringent." Penney, supra note 23, at 329; see
also Benner, supra note 24, at 107 ("[U]nder the Bram test, any interrogation tactic which
ordinarily would have the effect of producing either hope or fear in the mind of the suspect
rendered the confession involuntary without regard to the degree of influence exerted or
whether that influence was sufficient to overcome the suspect's 'will.'").
38 Penney, supra note 23, at 326.
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According to Steven Penney, "the Bram Court was asserting that it
was wrong for the state to pressure criminal suspects to confess, even
when the confession is perfectly trustworthy and was obtained in a hu-
mane and non-abusive manner." 39 The profound nature of that assertion
may have been masked, however, by the Court's reliance on "voluntari-
ness" language from prior cases.40 In Penney's view, the Court's reli-
ance on "voluntariness" and its failure to "repudiate the reliability-based
exclusionary rationale" of earlier cases "set the stage for future doctrinal
and theoretical confusion."'4t The Court had, in essence, expanded the
concept of "voluntariness" in such a way as to prohibit tactics beyond
those that might result in a false confession.
Bram was one in a long line of cases in which the Court has strug-
gled to define the meaning of an "involuntary" confession and the ques-
tion - sometimes related, sometimes not - of the scope and meaning
of the Fifth Amendment. In the immediate aftermath of Bram, however,
the Supreme Court's reliance on the Fifth Amendment as a basis for ex-
cluding confessions went into a state of hibernation. 42 In part, that was a
necessary corollary of the fact that the Court, until 1964, had held that
the Fifth Amendment did not apply to the states. 43 In federal cases, the
Court "can, and has, formulated rules of evidence in the exercise of its
'supervisory authority' over the administration of federal criminal justice
39 Id. at 331.
40 Cf. id. ("[T]he Bram court explained that it was merely applying the voluntariness test
which had previously been set out in Hopt [v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884)]."). The Hopt Court
held that a murder suspect's confession, made almost immediately after he was taken into
custody, was an example of a confession that was "freely and voluntarily made," and therefore
admissible. 110 U.S. at 584. Penney points out that "in linking the voluntariness doctrine with
the privilege against self-incrimination, the [Brain] Court reformulated the elements of the
former to conform with the strictures of the latter.., by detaching the voluntariness standard
from its implicit grounding in the reliability rationale." The Court "conceived of voluntariness
as a matter of individual freedom." Penney, supra note 23, at 327.
Benner argues that the privilege against self-incrimination was designed to encompass a
"cluster of rights," Benner, supra note 24, at 89, and that the emphasis on the voluntariness of
a confession failed to appreciate the scope of the privilege, see id. at 67-100. In his view, the
Bram Court "placed its imprimatur on this veil of ignorance, by engrafting the common law
voluntariness rule onto the [F]ifth [A]mendment and virtually equating the two." Id. at 100.
Wigmore had earlier criticized the Court for confusing the Fifth Amendment's requirements
with the common-law voluntariness doctrine. See supra note 25.
41 Penney, supra note 23, at 331.
42 See Stephen J. Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 437 ("Bram was promptly forgotten, and
for the next sixty years the Court consistently held that the fifth amendment privilege was
inapplicable to police interrogation.").
43 See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that Fifth Amendment applied to
the states via the Fourteenth Amendment and protected witness from answering potentially
incriminating questions in state gambling inquiry); id. at 17 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (pointing
out that "[a]s recently as 1961, this Court reaffirmed that 'the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was not applicable against the States"' (citing Cohen v. Hurley, 366
U.S. 117 (1961)).
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which go well beyond due process requirements. ' 44 Confessions in state
courts, however, were limited only by the constraints of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.
B. THE PRE-EMINENCE OF THE DUE PROCESS "VOLUNTARINESS"
TEST
4 5
As Joseph P. Grano has pointed out, the "effort to distinguish volun-
tary from involuntary actions dates back at least to Aristotle," 46 and it is
an enterprise fraught with difficulty. 47 Bookended by its Fifth Amend-
ment decisions in Bram and Miranda, the Court's analysis of the notion
of "voluntariness" in the confessions context was carried out under the
auspices of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 48
The due process voluntariness test was, not surprisingly, slippery.
The Court's confession cases "yield no talismanic definition of 'volunta-
riness,' mechanically applicable to 'the host of situations where the ques-
tion has arisen.'"49 Rather, "a complex of values underlies the stricture
against the use by the state of confessions which, by way of convenient
shorthand, the Court terms involuntary." 50 Although the Court's rela-
44 YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 446 (10th ed. 2002) (discuss-
ing development of McNabb-Mallory rule for confessions in federal cases).
45 It is beyond the scope of this article to provide more than a thumbnail sketch of the
Court's due process jurisprudence before Miranda, with an emphasis on cases that may have
particular relevance to an assessment of cases like Lindh. For a thorough treatment of the due
process cases, see Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2195
(1996); see also Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1427-37
(1985).
46 GRANO, supra note 30, at 61.
47 See generally DETERMINISM AND FREEDOM IN THE AGE OF MODERN SCIENCE (Sydney
Hook ed., 1957). Yale Kamisar suggests a way out of the dilemma. He argues that the terms
"voluntary" and "involuntary" are unhelpful in analyzing the "real reasons for excluding con-
fessions." Yale Kamisar, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession? Some Thoughts on Inbau
and Reid's Criminal Interrogation and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 759 (1963).
The key, he suggests, is not to look at the Court's conclusory labels but rather at what the
Court does in various confessions cases decided under the Due Process Clause. See id. at
745-46.
48 See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (explaining that "notions of
due process" prohibited coerced confessions before Miranda); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 441 (1974) ("In state cases the Court applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, examining the circumstances of interrogation to determine whether the processes
were so unfair or unreasonable as to render a subsequent confession involuntary."); Spano v.
New York, 360 U.S. 315, 315 (1959) (describing case as "another in the long line of cases
presenting the question whether a confession was properly admitted into evidence under the
Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Hancock, supra note 45, at 2196 (stating that due process
had a "constitutional reign of thirty years").
49 Schneckcloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224 (1973) (seeking guidance from
Court's confessions jurisprudence in resolving question of voluntariness in Fourth Amendment
consent search context).
50 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960).
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tively recent decision in Colorado v. Connelly5l inexplicably suggests to
the contrary, 52 one such historical value was the desire to prevent the
introduction into evidence of false, or unreliable, confessions. 53 Another
value was ensuring that police methods in law enforcement were appro-
priate. 54 Initially, the concern with police methods was with physical
abuse.
The chilling case of Brown v. Mississippi 55 in 1936 ushered in an
era of profound concern about police tactics in extracting confessions,
particularly in the South, where black suspects were frequently subjected
to grossly abusive police tactics. 56 It was the Court's first review of a
confession admitted into evidence in state court57 and, as Morgan Cloud
wrote recently, the Court's decision was "so progressive that after more
than half a century it remains one of the Court's great opinions. '58 As
Gerald M. Caplan has noted, Brown "was as appalling on its facts as
Miranda was benign." 59 Officials, accompanied by an angry mob, ex-
tracted a confession from one suspect after hanging him from a limb of a
tree with a rope, tying him to the tree, whipping him, then whipping him
again on a separate occasion. 60 Two other suspects were whipped with a
leather strap and buckle.6' The facts relating to the defendants' torture
51 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
52 The case is discussed in some detail in Part Ill.D, infra.
53 See Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV.
2001, 2009-14 (1998).
54 See id. at 2013.
55 297 U.S. 278. For a fuller discussion of the case, see generally Morgan Cloud, Tor-
ture and Truth, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1211 (1996).
56 See Hancock, supra note 45, at 2203 ("Due Process doctrine for police interrogations
began its life with the Court's dramatic creation of a Fourteenth Amendment exclusionary rule
in Brown v. Mississippi, where white police officers had procured murder confessions from
African American men by torturing them."); see also Caplan, supra note 45, at 1428 (the
application of the "third degree" in the South, "where it was fueled by racial prejudice and the
spectre of mob violence, was particularly shocking. Brown represented a twentieth century
application of the rack."); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is
Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1173 (2001) ("In Brown and other early cases, the Court
clearly believed that innocent persons had been convicted, and that their confessions were
unreliable."); see generally Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Pro-
cedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000).
57 See Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 437; cf. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964)
(noting that Brown "was the first case in which the Court held that the Due Process Clause
prohibited the States from using the accused's coerced confessions against him").
58 Cloud, supra note 55, at 1211.
59 Caplan, supra note 45, at 1427. The facts are recounted in detail in GRANO, supra
note 30, at 3-4, relying on both the United States and Mississippi Supreme Court opinions.
60 Brown, 297 U.S. at 281-82.
61 Id. at 282.
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and abuse were undisputed 62 and plainly repulsed the Court. 63 In a unan-
imous decision, the Court found a clear violation of due process.64
Later cases decided under the due process test were neither as easy
nor as uncontroversial as Brown. In particular, as the concern with brute
force diminished, the Court struggled in determining under what circum-
stances more subtle psychological pressures violated due process. Una-
nimity in denouncing this species of pressure largely evaded the Court,
and the decisions - far from speaking with the unified voice of Brown
- reflect bitter divisions. In addition, as Laurie Magid has noted,
"[e]ven though reliability was clearly uppermost in the Court's mind
when it decided Brown v. Mississippi, the Court gave mixed and confus-
ing signals in subsequent cases about the precise rationale for the volun-
tariness requirement." 65 In Ashcraft v. Tennessee,66 for example, a 6-3
majority of the Court held that the confession, if made at all, 67 was
"compelled" under circumstances that involved psychological pressure
rather than the use of brute force. 68 The Court described the relevant
considerations as follows: "For thirty-six hours after Ashcraft's seizure[,]
during which period he was held incommunicado, without sleep or rest,
relays of officers, experienced investigators, and highly trained lawyers
questioned him without respite." 69 Under those circumstances, the Court
found the situation "so inherently coercive that its very existence is irrec-
oncilable with the possession of mental freedom by a lone suspect
against whom its full coercive force is brought to bear." 70
Justice Jackson wrote a rousing dissent in Ashcraft.7' Noting con-
straints on the Court rooted in "the sovereign character of the several
62 Id. at 281; see also id. at 284-85 (noting that three witnesses who participated in
whippings, including the deputy, were introduced, and "not a single witness was introduced
who denied it").
63 See id. at 286 (describing procedure used to extract confession as "revolting to the
sense of justice"); cf Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 (1974) (describing fact situation
in Brown as "classical third-degree torture").
64 Brown, 297 U.S. at 287.
65 Magid, supra note 56, at 1174.
66 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
67 The Court's opinion reflects a jaded weariness with the testimony, which "follows the
usual pattern and is in hopeless conflict" as to both the circumstances surrounding the confes-
sion and the issue of whether the defendant confessed at all. See id. at 150-51.
68 See id. at 153.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 154.
71 322 U.S. 143, 156 (Jackson, J., dissenting). His dissenting opinion was joined by
Justices Roberts and Frankfurter. As Yale Kamisar put it more than twenty-five years ago,
"Ashcraft is a great case only because Jackson's dissent makes it so. The dissent is worth
quoting at length." Yale Kamisar, Fred E. Inbau: The Importance of Being Guilty, 68 J. CRIM.
L. &. CRIMINOLOGY 182, 185 (1977). The dissent is, in fact, widely quoted, see, e.g.,
Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 450 (describing how Jackson "passionately protested" the
Court's approach), and has been described as "one of the most honest and accurate statements
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States,' 72 he found the Court powerless to reverse state convictions
merely for "conduct which we may personally disapprove. 73 While re-
iterating the propriety of the Court's refusal to countenance confessions
that are deemed "involuntary" because of physical brutality,74 he found
that "we are in a different field" when considering confessions based
merely upon questioning, even if "persistent and prolonged. 75 Refer-
ring to questioning itself as an "indispensable instrumentality of jus-
tice," 76 he wrote that "the principles by which we may adjudge when it
passes constitutional limits are quite different from those that condemn
policy brutality, and are far more difficult to apply."'77 Saying that those
principles demand a "responsible and cautious" exercise of the Court's
power to limit the states, he warned that "we cannot read an indiscrimi-
nating hostility to mere interrogation into the Constitution without un-
duly fettering the States in protecting society from the criminal. 78
Justice Jackson pointed out that it is human nature to deny a
"shameful or guilty act"79 and noted that a "'voluntary confession' is not
likely to be the product of the same motives" that would influence the
giving of innocuous information.80 However, he was unpersuaded by the
majority's conclusion that Ashcraft's confession should be suppressed on
the basis of the coercion inherent in a lengthy interrogation. 81 "The term
'voluntary' confession does not mean voluntary in the sense of a confes-
sion to a priest merely to rid one's soul of a sense of guilt .... To speak
of any confessions of crime made after arrest as being 'voluntary' or
'uncoerced' is somewhat inaccurate, although traditional. ' 82 He ac-
knowledged the inherent coercion of a thirty-six-hour interrogation but
also pointed out that coercion also inheres in a one-hour interrogation
and in arrest and detention itself.83 He found it self-evident that such
circumstances "put pressure" upon the prisoner but questioned whether
such pressure is prohibited by the Constitution.84 Foreshadowing the
Court's decision in Miranda twenty-two years later, 85 he asked, "does
on confession from the Supreme Court," Peter Brooks, Essay, Storytelling Without Fear?
Confession in Law and Literature, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 19 (1996).
72 Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 157 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
73 Id. at 158.
74 Id. at 159-60.





80 Id. at 160-61.




85 See Hancock, supra note 45, at 2226 (noting that Jackson's dictum was "prophetic").
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the Constitution prohibit use of all confessions made after arrest because
questioning, while one is deprived of freedom, is 'inherently coercive'?
The Court does not quite say so, but it is moving far and fast in that
direction."86
Jackson's dissent also noted that the Court had historically relied
upon the duration and intensity of interrogation as factors in "estimating
its effect on the will of the individual involved"87 and that "some men
would withstand for days pressures that would destroy the will of another
in hours."'88 Previously, the "ultimate question" was whether the suspect
"was in possession of his own will and self-control at the time of confes-
sion," and Justice Jackson argued that the majority refused to abide by
that test in this case. 89 After a close examination of the circumstances
surrounding Ashcraft's confession and the proceedings in state court,90
he concluded that Ashcraft's "is not the case of an ignorant and unrepre-
sented defendant who has been the victim of prejudice" 91 and warned of
the dangers of using the Due Process Clause to "disable the States" from
protecting society against crime. 92 Justice Jackson noted that:
[W]e are not ready to say that the pressure to disclose
crime, involved in decent detention and lengthy exami-
nation, although we admit them to be "inherently coer-
cive," are denied to a State by the Constitution, where
they are not proved to have passed the individual's abil-
ity to resist and to admit, deny, or refuse to answer. 93
Five years later, however, in Watts v. Indiana,94 the Court again
found a due process violation after a lengthy interrogation. The Court
failed to reach a consensus as to how the case should be analyzed. Ap-
propriately, Justice Frankfurter, who wrote an opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court, acknowledged at the outset that "[i]n the applica-
86 Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 161 (Jackson, J., dissenting). As Kamisar points out:
Justice Black, who wrote the opinion for the Court in Ashcraft, no less than Justice
Jackson, who authored the ringing dissent, knew full well that in 1944 neither the
Court nor "the country" was "ready" for an affirmative answer to the question,
"[D]oes the Constitution prohibit use of all confessions made after arrest because
questioning, while one is deprived of freedom, is 'inherently coercive'?" As we
know now, it was not until 1966 [in the Miranda decision] that the Court, if not "the
country," grew "ready."
Kamisar, The Importance of Being Guilty, supra note 71, at 187.
87 Ashcraft, 322 U.S. at 161.
88 Id. at 162.
89 Id.
90 See id. at 163-73.
91 Id. at 173.
92 Id. at 174.
93 Id. at 170.
94 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
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tion of so embracing a constitutional concept as 'due process,' it would
be idle to expect at all times unanimity of view." 95 Indeed, only two
other justices joined his opinion; two justices separately concurred, one
concurred in part and dissented in part, and three dissented.96 In that
case, the suspect had been arrested, held for six days without arraignment
in derogation of state law, and subjected to lengthy nighttime interroga-
tion sessions.97
In addition to the length of interrogation, the Court considered the
circumstances under which Watts was confined, including two days of
solitary confinement in a cell called "the hole."' 98 Justice Frankfurter fur-
ther noted that Watts was "without friendly or professional aid and with-
out advice as to his constitutional rights" and that "[d]isregard of
rudimentary needs of life - opportunities for sleep and a decent allow-
ance for food" were relevant "as part of the total situation out of which
his confessions came and which stamped their character." 99
Justice Jackson concurred and dissented in Watts. In the course of
that opinion, he ruminated on the fact that suspects are not advised of
their right to counsel and pointedly identified a critical dilemma for crim-
inal procedure:
The suspect neither had nor was advised of his right to
counsel. This presents a real dilemma in a free society.
To subject one without counsel to questioning which
may and is intended to convict him, is a real peril to
individual freedom. To bring in a lawyer means a real
peril to solution of the crime, because, under our adver-
sary system, he deems that his sole duty is to protect his
client - guilty or innocent - and that in such a capac-
ity he owes no duty whatever to help society solve its
crime problem. Under this conception of criminal proce-
95 Id. at 51. Justice Frankfurter expounded upon the elusive concept of voluntariness as
follows:
A statement to be voluntary of course need not be volunteered. But if it is the
product of sustained pressure by the police it does not issue from a free choice.
When a suspect speaks because he is overborne, it is immaterial whether he has been
subjected to a physical or a mental ordeal. Eventual yielding to questioning under
such circumstances is plainly the product of the suction process of interrogation and
therefore the reverse of voluntary.
Id. at 53.
96 See id. at 55-57.
97 See id. at 56 (Douglas, J., concurring). The suspect was interrogated for about four
hours starting at 11:30 p.m. the first night and for about nine and a half hours starting at 5:30
p.m. on three of the next four nights. Id. at 52. Finally, at the end of the last such session, he
confessed. Id. at 57.
98 Id. at 53. "The hole" had no place but the floor to sleep or sit. Id. at 56.
99 Id. at 53; see also Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (suppressing confession on
similar facts, in 6-3 decision).
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dure, any lawyer worth his salt will tell the suspect in no
uncertain terms to make no statement to police under
any circumstances.100
Five years after Watts, in Spano v. New York,' 0 ' the Court ruled that
a state's use of psychological pressure went out of bounds. It found a
due process violation when the defendant's refusals to talk were ignored
in a persistent series of interrogation sessions spanning almost eight
hours.' 0 2 The defendant's repeated requests to consult with his attorney
were denied. He finally confessed after a close childhood friend, who
was then attending the police academy, falsely told Spano that Spano's
situation had gotten the friend "in a lot of trouble" and that he was con-
cerned for the financial welfare of himself, his pregnant wife, and his
three children. 10 3 The "friend"' 1 4 prevailed upon Spano on three occa-
sions without success. "Inevitably," however, "in the fourth such session
... lasting a full hour, petitioner succumbed to his friend's prevarications
and agreed to make a statement."' 0 5
In finding a due process violation, Chief Justice Warren explained
that society's "abhorrence" at the use of "involuntary confessions" is
based not just on their "inherent untrustworthiness" but also on the
"deep-rooted feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing
the law."'1 6 He acknowledged that, in the days since Brown v. Missis-
sippi, 107 the Court had not been confronted with such a case of brute
force, nor had any subsequent case approached "the 36 consecutive hours
of questioning present in Ashcraft v. Tennessee."'08 Nonetheless, Chief
Justice Warren noted that the more "sophisticated" methods being used
currently to "extract confessions" only make more difficult the Court's
100 Watts, 338 U.S. at 58-59 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (em-
phasis added). The emphasized language, which so succinctly states the likely effect of having
defense counsel present in the interrogation room, is widely quoted. See, e.g., Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S: 568, 577-78 (1961); see also Caplan, supra note 45, at 1438 (character-
izing Jackson's Watts dissent as "the most forthright and penetrating statement of the interests
at stake").
101 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
102 Id. at 315.
103 Id. at 319.
104 As the Chief Justice noted, Spano "was apparently unaware of John Gay's famous
couplet: 'An open foe may prove a curse, But a pretended friend is worse."' Id. at 323.
105 Id. at 319.
106 Id. at 320. As Kamisar points out, Spano makes clear "[t]hat the Court was applying a
'police methods' - as well as a 'trustworthiness' - test."' KAMISAR, MODERN CRIM NAL
PROCEDURE, supra note 44, at 441. Again, while Chief Justice Warren concludes that Spano's
will was "overborne" such that the confession was "involuntary," the key appears to be his
rejection of the police methods used. Cf Kamisar, What Is an Involuntary Confession?, supra
note 47, at 741.
107 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
108 Spano, 360 U.S. at 321 (citing Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (discussed
supra notes 66-93 and accompanying text)).
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"duty to enforce federal constitutional protections" because of "the more
delicate judgments to be made." 109 In this case, Spano's will was "over-
borne by official pressure, fatigue and sympathy falsely aroused."' 10 In
emphasizing Spano's "overborne will," Chief Justice Warren's concern
seemed more that the state interfered with the defendant's freedom to
choose whether to confess rather than with a concern that it extracted a
factually false confession from him."'
Indeed, in Rogers v. Richmond,1 12 the Court went even further, ex-
pressly rejecting the notion that reliability per se was at the heart of the
voluntariness inquiry. The Supreme Court chided the trial court for ad-
mitting a confession based on its reliability without focusing on whether
law enforcement acted "such as to overbear petitioner's will to resist and
bring about confessions not freely self-determined - a question to be
answered with complete disregard of whether or not petitioner in fact
spoke the truth."" 3
In 1961, Culombe v. Connecticut'14 represented one of the Court's
last internal struggles over the limits of the Due Process Clause in the
confessions cases during this era. Justice Frankfurter announced the
judgment of the Court, suppressing a confession on voluntariness
grounds, but his sprawling opinion"15 garnered only one additional
vote." 6 In expounding upon the state of the law, he wrote:
109 Id.
110 Id. at 323.
111 See Developments in the Law - Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REv. 935, 973 (1966)
(stating that due process inquiry focusing on defendant's state of mind "assumes that the con-
stitutionally protected interest of the accused is the right to decide, free from unfair pressure,
whether he wants to confess"). The difficulty, of course, comes in determining when pressure
is "unfair." Cf id. (noting evolution of definition of "unfair pressure" in thirty years leading
up to 1966).
In significant concurring opinions that foreshadow the later case of Massiah v. United
States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), Justices Douglas and Stewart emphasized the absence of counsel
after indictment as a significant basis for excluding the confession. Noting that the Constitu-
tion guarantees the assistance of counsel during a trial that is open to the public and protected
by procedural safeguards, Justice Stewart exhorted that "[slurely a Constitution which
promises that much can vouchsafe no less to the same man under midnight inquisition in the
squad room of a police station." Spano, 360 U.S. at 327 (Stewart, J., concurring). Ultimately,
Massiah "adopted the view advanced in the Spano concurring opinions." KAMISAR, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 44, § 448.
112 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
113 Id. at 544.
114 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
115 His opinion spans sixty-six pages and includes ninety-seven footnotes. See id. at
568-635.
116 Justice Stewart joined the Frankfurter opinion. Id. at 568. Chief Justice Warren wrote
a separate concurring opinion, taking issue with Justice Frankfurter's "lengthy and abstract
dissertations." Id. at 635. Justice Douglas wrote a separate concurrence, joined by Justice
Black. Id. at 637. Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Black, also
concurred separately. Id. at 641. Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark and Whittaker, filed
a dissenting opinion, although agreeing with "the general principles governing police interro-
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In light of our past opinions and.., the wide divergence
of views which men may reasonably maintain concern-
ing the propriety of various police investigative proce-
dures not involving the employment of obvious brutality,
this much seems certain: It is impossible for this Court,
in enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, to attempt pre-
cisely to delimit, or to surround with specific, all-inclu-
sive restrictions, the power of interrogation allowed to
state law enforcement officers in obtaining confessions.
* . . The ultimate test remains that which has been the
only clearly established test in Anglo-American courts
for two hundred years: the test of voluntariness. Is the
confession the product of an essentially free and uncon-
strained choice by its maker? ... If it is not, if his will
has been overborne and his capacity for self-determina-
tion critically impaired, the use of his confession offends
due process.' "7
In writing about the history of confessions law, Steven Penney
makes a compelling case that the Court's pre-Miranda jurisprudence
charts an uneven path. 1 8 He identifies three themes that dominate the
Court's opinions: concerns with the unreliability of confessions extracted
under questionable circumstances," 9 a desire to deter abusive police
gation" outlined in the Frankfurter opinion. Id. at 642. In addition to deeply dividing the
Court, Justice Frankfurter's ambitious opinion has drawn decidedly mixed academic reviews.
See Kamisar, What Is an Involuntary Confession?, supra note 47, at 744 ("One who plods
through the sixty-seven page Culombe 'treatise' ... cannot help but wonder whether the strug-
gle was worth it"; illustrating that opinion's use of "colorful" but unilluminating language
"threatens to enhance existing uncertainty and confusion"); Penney, supra note 23, at 352
(describing the opinion as "the most sophisticated, honest, and intellectually rigorous of any of
the Court's explications of the due process voluntariness rule"); id. at 351-52 (noting that the
opinion is "[wlidely condemned for its verbosity and abstruseness"); Seidman, supra note 8, at
730 (referring to the Culombe opinion as a "total disaster" and "riven with contradiction"
despite being "elegantly written," "meticulously researched and filled with erudition").
1 17 Culombe, 367 U.S. at 601-02. Justice Frankfurter noted that Culombe was a "mental
defective," id. at 620, and judged that persistent questioning acted to overbear the suspect's
will:
Culombe was detained in the effective custody of the police for four nights and a
substantial portion of five days before he confessed. During that time he was ques-
tioned so repeatedly, although intermittently, that he cannot but have been made to
believe what the police hardly denied, that the police wanted answers and were de-
termined to get them.
Id. at 625.
118 See Penney, supra note 23, at 309.
119 But see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986) (discussed infra Part 1Il.D) (sug-
gesting that reliability of confessions is not a concern of due process).
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practices,' 20 and a concern with protecting the autonomy of the individ-
ual suspect. 12
Gerald M. Caplan, however, in his classic article, Questioning Mi-
randa,2 2 defends the Court's development of the voluntariness standard,
noting that "[p]ragmatism may have been preferable to principles at a
time when there was little general agreement on the principles to be ap-
plied." 23 In his view, "When social cohesion and solidarity are strained,
there is merit in an approach that, while showing direction toward in-
creased police restraint, proceeds imprecisely and with some ambiguity,
avoiding reductionism and overgeneralization."'1
24
Of course, the goals of avoiding unreliable confessions and deter-
ring police misconduct are complementary. Abhorrent police practices
are often the tactics likely to produce unreliable confessions. 125 One of
the problems, however, is that of the Court's legitimacy in decreeing
"unconstitutional" any tactics that fall far short of the outrageous conduct
that prompted the confession in Brown.126 The Brown decision was
unanimous, while the later decisions were the product of a deeply frac-
tured Court.
120 Most commentators have focused on some version of Penney's first two concerns.
See GRANO, supra note 30, at 65 ("In the view of most commentators, courts have had two real
reasons for excluding confessions as involuntary: (1) a desire, surviving from the common-law
approach, to eliminate untrustworthy confessions and (2) a desire to control offensive police
practices.").
121 See Penney, supra note 23, at 313. Penney argues forcefully that the third concern,
which he refers to as the "self-determination theory," is "morally suspect" because "the idea
that criminal suspects should have an intrinsic, deontological right to silence fails to accord
with widely-held views of political and personal morality." Id.
122 See Caplan, supra note 45.
123 Id. at 1434.
124 Id.
125 Cf Edith Rose Gardner, Comment, Coerced Confessions of Prisoners of War, 24 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 528, 534-40 (1955) (detailing conditions endured by American prisoners of
war in the Korean conflict, some of whom made false confessions).
126 See Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 160 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (noting
that the Court should be "more responsible and cautious" in adjudging when interrogation, as
compared to brutality, "passes constitutional limits").
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C. THE MIRANDA DECISION AND A RETURN TO THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's landmark decision 127 in Miranda v. Ari-
zona 128 adopted a different approach, 129 relying on the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination.' 30 The Court surveyed police manuals
that encouraged the police to use relentless questioning techniques and
psychological ploys to encourage confessions and expressed grave con-
cern that a suspect's will could be overborne in a custodial setting, un-
dermining his privilege against self-incrimination.131
As commentators have pointed out, Miranda "combines several dis-
tinct holdings."' 132 One is that stationhouse interrogation is inherently
coercive. 133 Having surveyed various tactics used in modem interroga-
tion practice, the Court put it this way:
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is
created for no purpose other than to subjugate the indi-
127 Charles D. Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1121,
1121 (2001) ("Miranda v. Arizona established the high water mark of the protections afforded
an accused during a custodial interrogation. During the decades that followed, the United
States Supreme Court allowed Miranda's foundation to erode, inviting a direct challenge to the
landmark ruling.") (citation omitted).
128 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Miranda opinion actually disposed of four cases, all of
which involved confessions that were ultimately suppressed. See id.
129 See White, supra note 53, at 2003 (Miranda "established the most important new
approach for dealing with the constitutional admissibility of confessions").
Two years earlier, the Court had decided two confessions cases under the auspices of the
Sixth Amendment. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378
U.S. 478 (1964). Those cases are addressed in Darmer, supra note 10, at 255-59. Not surpris-
ingly, "[o]n the heels of the Court's decisions in Escobedo and Massiah, the lawyers for Er-
nesto Miranda [had] relied on the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments in urging reversal of his
conviction." Id. at 259 (citing Paul C. Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot, § 3501 and the
Overhauling of Miranda, 85 IOWA L. REV. 175, 191 n.35 (1999)). Miranda, however, rooted
modem confessions jurisprudence in the Fifth Amendment.
130 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439, 467. While this was the first time since Bram that the
Court explicitly applied the Fifth Amendment to custodial interrogation, the majority asserted
that "our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles
long recognized and applied in other settings." Id. at 442. But see id. at 531 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he Court's holding today is neither compelled nor even strongly suggested by
the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at odds with American and English legal history, and
involves a departure from a long line of precedent.").
131 See id. at 448-58. Bernard Weisberg, who argued the earlier Escobedo case for the
A.C.L.U. as amicus, had likewise relied on police interrogation manuals in his brief in that
case. KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 44, at 451. See also Bernard
Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMI-
NOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 21, 22-26 (1961).
132 Charles D. Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 109, 112 (1998);
Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 436.
133 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458; Schulhofer, supra note 15, at 436. Indeed, as Donald
A. Dripps has argued, "[tihe essence of Miranda is the proposition that statements obtained by
custodial interrogation are presumed to be compelled in violation of the Fifth Amendment."
Dripps, supra note 16, at 28.
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vidual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere car-
ries its own badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not
physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of
human dignity. The current practice of incommunicado
interrogation is at odds with one of our Nation's most
cherished principles - that the individual may not be
compelled to incriminate himself. Unless adequate pro-
tective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement ob-
tained from the defendant can truly be the product of his
free choice. 134
The Court thus held that a custodial confession would be presumed in-
voluntary, and thus would be inadmissible, if the police failed to give a
suspect four specified warnings, now widely recognized: that he has the
right to remain silent; that any statements he makes can be used against
him; that he has the right to an attorney during questioning; and that an
attorney will be appointed for him if he cannot afford one.1 35 Attaching
a presumption of involuntariness to a confession just because it was ob-
tained during the course of custodial interrogation was a startling break
with precedent. 136 On the facts, the confessions at issue in Miranda al-
most certainly would have been admissible under the old voluntariness
test. 137
Miranda was decided by a vote of only 5-4.138 In strongly worded
opinions, the dissenting justices questioned its constitutional underpin-
nings and predicted dire consequences for law enforcement. 139 Justice
134 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58.
135 Id. at 444. For fuller treatment of the decision, see Caplan, supra note 45; Cassell,
supra note 129, at 183-94 (including in-depth account of the underlying investigation and
confession of Miranda based upon the firsthand account of former Phoenix police Captain
Carroll F. Cooley); Dripps, supra note 16, at 13-23 (including discussion of certiorari pro-
cess); Fred E. Inbau, "Playing God": 5 to 4 (The Supreme Court and the Police), 57 J. CRIM.
L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE Sci. 377, 377 (1966); Yale Kamisar, A Dissent From the Miranda
Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntariness" Test,
65 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1966); and Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, supra note 132, at 117-25
(including discussion of certiorari process).
136 See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 531 (White, J., dissenting). But see Hancock, supra
note 45, at 2232-36 (arguing that Miranda was natural outgrowth of concerns about custodial
interrogation expressed in Court's due process cases).
137 See GRANO, supra note 30, at 102 (noting that "Miranda and Brown are fish from very
different kettles" and that the Court had "conceded with magnificent understatement that it
might not have found Miranda's statement 'to have been involuntary in traditional terms'")
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457).
138 Critics of the decision have emphasized that point. See, e.g., Inbau, supra note 135, at
377.
139 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting in three cases and concurring in one)
("The ipse dixit of the majority has no support in our cases."); id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing) ("the decision of the Court represents poor constitutional law and entails harmful conse-
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Harlan, in an opinion joined by two other justices, 140 argued that the due
process clauses provide an "adequate tool" to deal with confessions
problems. 14 1 In his view, the new rules fashioned by the majority under
the auspices of the Fifth Amendment were not truly designed to guard
against police brutality or illegal coercion. 142 Rather, he believed, "the
thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressure, to reinforce the nervous
or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any confession at all.
The aim in short is toward 'voluntariness' in a utopian sense, or to view
it from a different angle, voluntariness with a vengeance."' 143
As Justice Harlan assumed, this new way of defining "compulsion"
was something quite different from the definition of "coercion" in the
due process line of cases. As counsel for one of the petitioners conceded
at oral argument in response to a question from Harlan, his client's con-
fession was "[i]n no sense" coerced.144 Rather, "compulsion" under the
Fifth Amendment was a broader concept than "coercion" under the Due
Process Clause. 145
Meanwhile, "[c]ommentators and politicians proclaimed the deci-
sion a disaster for law enforcement"' 146 and denounced the decision as
"an illegitimate and misguided instance of judicial fiat."' 147 The majority
denied that its decision "create[d] a constitutional straitjacket"' 148 and en-
quences for the country at large"); id. at 526 (White, J., dissenting) ("The proposition that the
privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation without the warnings spec-
ified in the majority opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in
the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment.").
140 Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justices Stewart and White joined the Harlan
opinion.
141 See id. at 505. For a criticism of the Harlan view, see Hancock, supra note 45, at 2201
("Thanks to Justice Harlan and to those who credit his interpretation, a kind of mythology now
envelops the old Due Process cases, so that their complexities are simplified and their incon-
sistencies forgotten.").
142 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
143 Id.
144 KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 44, at 460-61 (quoting Victor
M. Earle III, counsel for petitioner Vignera).
145 See id. at 461; George C. Thomas IlI, Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless:
Miranda and the Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1087 (2001) ("The sub-
stitution of Fifth Amendment 'compulsion' for due process 'coercion' as the relevant inquiry
was almost certainly intended to lower the bar and make it easier for defendants to suppress
confessions."). Subsequent to the Miranda decision, however, the line between "compelled"
confessions under the Fifth Amendment and "coerced" confessions under the due process vol-
untariness test has become blurred, with the Supreme Court treating the two terms as synony-
mous. See infra note 267. Steven Schulhofer, however, argues that "Fifth Amendment
requirements do 'sweep more broadly' than those of the Fourteenth" and insists that "[t]he
premise that Fifth Amendment compulsion means involuntariness is simply incoherent." Ste-
phen J. Schulhofer, Miranda, Dickerson, and the Puzzling Persistence of Fifth Amendment
Exceptionalism, 99 MICH. L. REV. 941, 950, 946 (2001).
146 Lunney, supra note 30, at 745-46.
147 Id. at 746.
148 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
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couraged Congress and the states to search for alternative procedures that
would protect a suspect's rights while promoting efficient law
enforcement. 149
One of the weaknesses of Miranda is that it accomplishes both too
little and too much.1 50 As Justice Harlan noted in his dissenting opinion,
the rules do not prevent "blatant coercion," because police officers
predisposed to use inappropriate tactics are equally able and likely to lie
about warnings and waivers.151 Put bluntly, an officer inclined to take a
swing at a suspect surely would not hesitate to ignore the Miranda pro-
tections yet then insist on the witness stand that he had given the pre-
scribed warnings.
On the other hand, Miranda goes too far by providing no flexibility
to balance other factors against the lack of warnings. 152 Its rationale is
flawed because it constructs a legal fiction of "compulsion" that applies
to any custodial interrogation, regardless of the particular circum-
stances.153 Thus, compulsion is implied when a terrified, uneducated im-
migrant is questioned relentlessly by a team of seasoned interrogators,
but compulsion is likewise implied when a hardened criminal responds to
a single question put by a lone rookie investigator more scared of the
suspect than the suspect is of him. 154
149 See id. Congress responded two years later with Title II of the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Acts of 1968, which purported to overrule Miranda in 18 U.S.C. § 3501.
See generally Cassell, The Statute That Time Forgot, supra note 129. The constitutionality of
§ 3501 was not squarely addressed until Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
150 See R. Kent Greenawalt, Silence as a Moral and Constitutional Right, 23 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 15, 68 (1981) (citation omitted) ("As the dissenters in Miranda clearly recog-
nized, the Miranda rules are not fully responsive to the concern that underlay their creation.");
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, supra note 15, at 461 (arguing that Miranda's require-
ment that specified warnings be given does not go far enough in protecting a suspect from
compulsion); cf. Yale Kamisar, Miranda Thirty-Five Years Later: A Close Look at the Major-
ity and Dissenting Opinions in Dickerson, 33 ARIz. ST. L.J. 387, 387 (2001) ("Over the years,
Miranda v. Arizona has been criticized both for going too far and for not going far enough.")
(citations omitted).
151 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
152 Cf. Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court's Failures in Dicker-
son, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 918 (2001) ("Miranda's lack of proportionality is shown not only
by its overbroad reach in particular cases, but also by its unlimited application.").
153 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 533-34 (White, J., dissenting); cf Dripps, supra note 16, at
23 ("If custody is inherently coercive, it is hard to see how the suspect can make a voluntary
waiver in a coercive environment.").
154 Moreover, this presumption of compulsion presents problems for the concept of mean-
ingful waiver. As Joseph D. Grano points out, "If a simple response to a single custodial
question must be viewed as presumptively compelled, the possibility of having a voluntary
waiver is difficult to understand." Joseph D. Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The
Professional Interrogator and Modern Confessions Law, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1465,
1476 (1999) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 536 (White, J., dissenting)).
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D. THE COURT'S POST-MIRANDA JURISPRUDENCE
Ultimately, however, Miranda changed the landscape of confes-
sions law less than might have been predicted. "In practice, the grand
vision of Miranda soared only on the pages of the majority opinion, and
foundered in the workaday world of competing considerations, such as
crime control."' 155 Since Miranda was decided, the Court has held that
statements taken without providing warnings can be used to impeach a
defendant, 156 has recognized a "public safety exception" to the provision
of warnings, 157 and has held that, in at least some circumstances, the
"fruits" of a Miranda violation need not be suppressed. 158
Despite strong language in Miranda itself about the constitutional
nature of that decision and its relationship to the Fifth Amendment, the
Court later undermined the holdings of Miranda by describing the Mi-
randa rules as merely "prophylactic."' 159 In New York v. Quarles, for
example, the Court declined to suppress the defendant's answer to a
question about the location of a gun, despite the fact that the question
was not preceded by warnings. 160 In an opinion authored by Justice
Rehnquist, the Supreme Court found that "this case presents a situation
where concern for public safety must be paramount to adherence to the
literal language of the prophylactic rules enunciated in Miranda."'16
The Court emphasized that there was no suggestion that the state-
ments at issue were "actually compelled by police conduct which over-
came [the defendant's] will to resist."' 162 Accordingly, the Court framed
the issue as whether the officer had been "justified in failing to make
155 Darmer, supra note 10, at 264. Cf. William J. Stuntz, Miranda's Mistake, 99 MICH. L.
Rav. 975, 998 (2001) (describing Miranda as a "modest failure" that "is not the guardian of
civil liberties that its defenders think it is"); see generally Seidman, supra note 8, at 744-46
(suggesting that vulnerable suspects are worse off under Miranda than they were before).
156 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
157 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
158 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985) (when police initially interrogated suspect
and obtained admission without giving Miranda warnings, a later statement made after Mi-
randa warnings were given was admissible); cf. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 449 (1974)
(in case in which statement was taken before Miranda was decided, unwarned statement was
not allowed into evidence but witness identified in statement was permitted to testify). As one
commentator has pointed out, "although the Court in Tucker did not decide whether the 'fruits'
doctrine is applicable to Miranda, a holding of inapplicability would now seem to be within
easy reach." Stone, supra note 8 at 123. This is even more true after the Elstad decision,
which sowed the seeds for a far-reaching exception to the fruits doctrine.
159 For a more thorough discussion of the Court's "prophylaxis line" of cases, see
Darmer, supra note 10, at 264-68. For the competing view that the interpretation of Miranda
as both a prophylactic rule and constitutionally based is constitutionally principled, see God-
sey, supra note 3, at 1745-52.
160 Quarles, 467 U.S. 659. The following discussion of Quarles is taken from the fuller
discussion of the case in Darmer, supra note 10, at 266-68.
161 Quarles, 467 U.S. at 653 (emphasis added).
162 Id. at 654.
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available to respondent the procedural safeguards associated with the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination since Miranda.'163 The
Court held that the officer was justified and that "the doctrinal underpin-
nings of Miranda" do not require that it "be applied in all its rigor to a
situation" in which questions are "reasonably prompted by a concern for
the public safety." 164
The Rehnquist opinion drew a sharp dissent from three other jus-
tices. 165 Justice Marshall asserted that, in crafting a "public safety"
exception:
[T]he majority makes no attempt to deal with the consti-
tutional presumption established by [Miranda] ...
Without establishing that interrogations concerning the
public's safety are less likely to be coercive than other
interrogations, the majority cannot endorse the "public-
safety" exception and remain faithful to the logic of Mi-
randa v. Arizona.166
In the dissent's view, authorities faced with a genuine emergency that
demands immediate answers are not confronted with a dilemma. Rather:
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise
imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate
suspects without advising them of their constitutional
rights .... If trickery is necessary to protect the public,
then the police may trick a suspect into confessing.
While the Fourteenth Amendment sets limits on such be-
havior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or our decision
in Miranda v. Arizona proscribes this sort of emergency
questioning. All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the in-
troduction of coerced statements at trial.167
163 Id. at 654-55.
164 Id. at 656.
165 See id. at 674 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and Stevens joined the Mar-
shall dissent. Justice O'Connor filed a separate opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in
part. Id. at 673-74.
166 Id. at 684 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 686 (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (Sixth Amendment
violated only if trial affected)). Justice O'Connor made a similar point in her concurring
opinion:
Miranda has never been read to prohibit the police from asking questions to secure
the public safety. Rather, the critical question Miranda addresses is who shall bear
the cost of securing the public safety when such questions are asked and answered:
the defendant or the State.... When police ask custodial questions without adminis-
tering the required warnings, Miranda quite clearly requires that the answers be pre-
sumed compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at trial.
Id. at 664 (concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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Justice Marshall was quite right in insisting that the Court's decision
betrayed the logic of Miranda. By emphasizing that Quarles's state-
ments were not "actually compelled,"'168 the Court drew a line between
real compulsion and the presumption of compulsion that inheres in every
situation involving custodial interrogation, according to Miranda.169 Yet
the irrebuttable presumption established by Miranda is itself
problematic.
Given the Court's repeated reference to Miranda as a "prophylac-
tic" decision that "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment it-
self," many expected the Court to overrule Miranda outright 70 when it
was given the chance in Dickerson v. United States.17 ' In that case, how-
ever, the Court rejected a statute 72 designed to replace Miranda 73 that
prescribed a totality-of-the-circumstances test to determine whether a
confession was coerced. 17 4 The Court referred to Miranda as a "consti-
tutional decision" that Congress cannot overrule. 75 Acknowledging that
cases such as Quarles had carved out exceptions to its rule, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, noted that those decisions:
illustrate the principle - not that Miranda is not a con-
stitutional rule - but that no constitutional rule is im-
mutable. No court laying down a general rule can
168 Id. at 654.
169 Thomas, supra note 145, at 1085 ("As Quarles makes clear, the Court has over the
years adopted the less expansive, or 'weak' version of Miranda's holding - not that every
statement is compelled but that the warnings are necessary because the risk of compulsion is
so great. If the warnings are not given, the presumption of coercion will usually, but not
always, require suppression of statements made in response to custodial interrogation.").
170 Cf. KAMISAR, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 44, at 561 (noting that most
experts expected Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas to uphold the validity of § 3501 and consid-
ered Kennedy and O'Connor to be "'swing votes.' But a number of Miranda supporters
feared that, based on the basis of her majority opinion in Oregon v. Elstad and her strong
dissent in Withrow v. Williams, Justice O'Connor would vote to uphold § 3501. As it turned
out, most experts were wide of the mark.") But see Kamisar, The Importance of Being Guilty,
supra note 71, at 187 n.27 (correctly doubting, more than twenty-five years ago, that Miranda
would "be formally overruled" and attributing its survival to Court's "niggardly interpreta-
tions" of the decision).
171 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
172 18 U.S.C. § 3501. The statute essentially tracked the pre-Miranda due process volun-
tary test that Miranda had been designed to replace. See Yale Kamisar, Can (Did) Congress
"Overrule" Miranda?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 883, 951 (2000) (Congress "chose not to replace
the Miranda warnings with a credible substitute. Instead ... Congress contented itself with
making the pre-Miranda voluntariness test the sole test for admissibility of confessions.").
173 Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dickerson, supra note 127, at 1131. Section
3501 has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere, most notably by Paul C. Cassell. See Cassell,
The Statute That Time Forgot, supra note 129.
174 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434.
175 Id. at 432. The case has been the subject of extensive academic analysis and, for the
most part, criticism. See, e.g., Symposium, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confes-
sion Law, 99 MICH. L. REV. 879 (2001).
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possibly foresee the various circumstances in which
counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort of modifica-
tions represented by these cases are as much a normal
part of constitutional law as the original decision.' 76
II. THE APPLICATION OF MIRANDA TO SUSPECTS
QUESTIONED ABROAD
A. THE BiN LADEN CASE
One set of circumstances that the Miranda Court perhaps did not
foresee was the application of the rules to nonresident aliens captured
abroad. In United States v. Bin Laden,177 a district court confronted this
issue when dealing with the admissibility of confessions made by two
suspected bin Laden confederates in connection with the bombing of
U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.
In addressing the issue as "a matter of first impression," Judge Leo-
nard B. Sand asked whether a nonresident alien defendant's non-
Mirandized statements were admissible at trial in the United States when
the statements were the result of interrogations conducted abroad by U.S.
law enforcement officials. 178 The court concluded that the Fifth Amend-
ment's right against self-incrimination applies to the extent that the alien
suspect is on trial in the United States.' 79 In addition, U.S. law enforce-
ment agents conducting investigations abroad should still use the familiar
Miranda warnings framework, "even if [the] interrogation by U.S. agents
occur[s] wholly abroad.., while [the defendant is] in the physical cus-
tody of foreign authorities." 180
The court refused to define the issue as one of extraterritorial appli-
cation of the Fifth Amendment, despite the government's argument that
it should. 181 The government's definition of the issue as whether Fifth
Amendment rights "reach out to protect individuals . . . outside the
United States" failed to convince the court because "any violation of the
privilege against self-incrimination occurs, not at the moment law en-
forcement officials coerce statements through custodial interrogation, but
176 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441. I think Justice Scalia, who argued that many of the
Court's post-Miranda decisions "do not make sense" if confessions taken in violation of Mi-
randa are "compelled" in violation of the Constitution, id. at 455 (Scalia, J., dissenting), had
the better of the arguments in this regard. For a fuller discussion of his dissenting opinion, see
Darmer, supra note 10, at 270. But see Godsey, supra note 3, at 1742-52 (arguing that Dick-
erson's interpretation that Miranda is both a prophylactic rule and constitutionally based is
consistent with other jurisprudence).
177 132 F. Supp. 2d 168 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
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when a defendant's involuntary statements are actually used against him
at an American criminal proceeding."' 82 Therefore, according to this
court, the admissibility of custodial confessions hinges upon the scope of
the privilege as it applies to a nonresident alien defendant currently sub-
ject to American domestic criminal proceedings.18 3
The court noted that the "expansive language" of the Fifth Amend-
ment "neither denotes nor connotes any limitation in scope."' 84 The use
of "no person" instead of the familiar phrase "the people" suggests that
the right against self-incrimination applies "without apparent regard to
citizenship or community connection."'' 85 The Supreme Court has al-
ready determined that the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments' due process
protections apply without limitation to "every one."' 8 6 Judge Sand deter-
mined that even without an explicit Supreme Court ruling granting the
privilege against self-incrimination in this context, the circumstances ex-
emplified the widely accepted notion that these protections apply "uni-
versally to any criminal prosecution brought by the United States within
its own borders."' 187 Notably, the U.S. Supreme Court has defined the
right against self-incrimination as a "fundamental trial right of criminal
defendants."1 88 Finally, Judge Sand believed that the underlying policies
of the Fifth Amendment "are no less relevant when the criminal defen-
dant at issue is an unconnected, non-resident alien."' 89
Judge Sand further held that "a principled, but realistic application
of Miranda's familiar warning/waiver framework ... is both necessary
and appropriate under the Fifth Amendment."' 190 Miranda is required
because "the inherent coerciveness of [police interrogation] is clearly no
less troubling when carried out beyond our borders and under the aegis
of a foreign stationhouse."' 19 A foreign stationhouse presents an even
"greater threat[ ] of compulsion" because the American authorities lack
182 Id. at 181-82.
183 Id. at 182.
184 Id. at 183; see also note 20 and accompanying text.
185 Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183. For a thorough discussion of this point, see God-
sey, supra note 3, at 1729-33. The government maintained that the scope of any Fifth Amend-
ment privilege was directly related to the level an alien "has sought to insert himself' into the
community. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183 (internal citation omitted). While the court
suggested that this proposition might be valid in other contexts, such as immigration, it found
the idea of differing levels of Fifth Amendment protections for "criminal defendants on trial in
a U.S. court" to be "unsupportable." Id. For a discussion of the "ascending scale of rights
test" and its applicability to the privilege against self-incrimination, see Godsey, supra note 3,
at 1729-33 (rejecting test in context of privilege).
186 Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
187 Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 183.
188 Id. at 184 (citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).
189 Id. at 185.
190 Id. at 185-86.
191 Id. at 186.
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total control over the suspect. 92 Judge Sand also noted that suspects
might be "unduly predisposed" to talk to U.S. authorities in hopes of
relocation to the United States, where there are greater protections af-
forded criminal defendants. 193 American law enforcement agents should
therefore employ the Miranda warnings to safeguard the privilege
against self-incrimination. 94 Judge Sand specifically held that custodial
confessions "should be admitted as evidence at trial only if the Govern-
ment demonstrates that the defendant was first advised of his rights and
that he validly waived those rights."' 95 In the absence of either condi-
tion, suppression is the appropriate protection afforded the defendant and
the appropriate deterrent on U.S. agents. 196
Judge Sand acknowledged that the specific Miranda warnings re-
lated to the right to counsel and the ability to have counsel appointed are
subject to modification in the context of foreign interrogation, where
counsel may be unavailable. 97 He held, however, that "the specific ad-
monitions recited should conform to the local circumstances regarding
access to counsel."' 198 As Mark Godsey has recently argued, Judge Sand
imposed upon U.S. agents conducting investigations abroad an extraordi-
nary and unrealistic duty to discern relevant foreign law, and Godsey
proposed an alternative modification to the Miranda warnings abroad.' 99
192 Id.
193 Id. at 186 n.12.
194 Id. at 187.
195 Id.
196 Id. Judge Sand discusses further the fact that certain aspects of Miranda have limited
application in foreign settings, namely the right to the assistance and presence of counsel. Id.
at 187-88. The right to counsel varies depending upon the availability in the foreign context
of foreign counsel and willingness of the foreign state to provide such counsel. See id. at 188.
Essentially, U.S. law enforcement must, to the extent possible, replicate the rights that would
be available if the interrogation took place in the United States. Id. Because such replication
is not always possible, "the fair and correct approach under Miranda is for U.S. law enforce-
ment simply to be clear and candid as to both the existence of the right to counsel and the
possible impediments to its exercise." Id. The fact that the defendant is in foreign custody at
the time an interrogation by U.S. agents occurs "matters only insofar as the specific admoni-
tions recited should conform to the local circumstances regarding access to counsel." Id. at
189. Judge Sand ultimately determined that the warnings given to one defendant, Mohamed
Rashed Daoud Al-'Owhali, were initially defective and only cured by subsequent statements;
thus, portions of Al-'Owhali's statements were suppressed. Id. at 192-94. Suppression was
not granted in the case of another defendant, K.K. Mohamed, because he was twice advised of
his right to counsel under South African law, in addition to the facially deficient warnings. Id.
at 194. In his recent article about the case, Godsey advocated a modification of Sand's ap-
proach to the warnings regarding waiver. See Godsey, supra note 3, at 1780-81.
197 See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 188.
198 Id. at 189.
199 See Godsey, supra note 3, at 1774-75 (proposing that "American law enforcement
officials" should be required only to "act in good faith and make a reasonable effort, under the
circumstances, to determine what rights are available to a suspect" in the country where the
interrogation occurs); see also Mark A. Godsey, The New Frontier of Constitutional Confes-
sion Law - The International Arena: Exploring the Admissibility of Confessions Taken by
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I would go even further than Godsey by carving out a "foreign inter-
rogation" exception to Miranda in situations such as those present in Bin
Laden.200
B. THE IMPLICATION OF INTERPRETING MIRANDA AS ONLY A TRIAL
RIGHT
Before analyzing the justification of Judge Sand's holding that Mi-
randa warnings are required abroad, however, it is important to scruti-
nize the theoretical underpinnings of that holding. Central to Judge
Sand's analysis was the notion that a Miranda-based violation of the
Fifth Amendment does not occur until the trial itself. This view is exem-
plified in Kastigar v. United States20' and the rest of the immunity line of
cases, in which witnesses have been granted immunity from prosecution
in exchange for their testimony. In those cases, "the Supreme Court
made clear that the 'sole concern' of the privilege was not the forcible
extraction of statements; rather, the privilege only prohibits the introduc-
tion into evidence of such statements at trial or similar proceeding to
inflict criminal penalties upon the person who has been 'compelled' to
speak. 20 2
Applying this interpretation of the privilege to the context of custo-
dial questioning of suspects, the interrogation process itself works no
Fifth Amendment violation; an interrogator could ask questions without
providing warnings - and could even brutalize or torture a suspect -
without violating the Self-Incrimination Clause.20 3 Justice Marshall es-
poused just this view of the Fifth Amendment in his dissenting opinion in
Quarles, and the implications of that view are once again relevant, par-
ticularly in the terrorism context:
If a bomb is about to explode or the public is otherwise
imminently imperiled, the police are free to interrogate
suspects without advising them of their constitutional
rights .... If trickery is necessary to protect the public,
then the police may trick a suspect into confessing.
While the Fourteenth Amendment sets limits on such be-
havior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or our decision
in Miranda proscribes this sort of emergency question-
U.S. Investigators from Non-Americans Abroad, 91 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming April 2003, draft
on file with author) ("courts should not require FBI agents to strictly adhere to the dictates of
Miranda abroad").
200 See Part II.C, infra.
201 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
202 Godsey, The New Frontier, supra note 199. Godsey discusses the immunity line of
cases at some length in his forthcoming article. See id.
203 However, doing so would presumably violate the Due Process Clause. See Brown v.
Mississippi, 279 U.S. 278 (1936) (discussed supra Part I.B).
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ing. All the Fifth Amendment forbids is the introduction
of coerced statements at trial.20 4
Judge Sand, echoing the views of Justice Marshall, similarly sug-
gested that American intelligence efforts abroad would not be unduly
impeded by applying the Miranda rules abroad: "To the extent that a
suspect's Miranda rights allegedly impede foreign intelligence collec-
tion, we note that Miranda only prevents an unwarned or involuntary
statement from being used as evidence in a domestic criminal trial; it
does not mean that such statements are never to be elicited in the first
place."205
Similarly, in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,20 6 upon which
Judge Sand explicitly relied, 20 7 the Supreme Court described the privi-
lege against self-incrimination as a "fundamental trial right of criminal
defendants. '20 8 Accordingly, "[a]lthough conduct by law enforcement
officials prior to trial may ultimately impair that right, a constitutional
violation occurs only at trial."'209
Though this is a conventional assumption, the Ninth Circuit has re-
cently challenged it. In the case of Martinez v. City of Oxnard,210 an
individual brought a civil suit 21 1 alleging that a police officer violated his
rights under both the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments by "subjecting
him to a coercive interrogation while he was receiving medical care. 212
The court denied the officer's defense of qualified immunity, holding
that coercive questioning itself violates the Fifth Amendment, even if the
204 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 686 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added). Interestingly, Justice Harlan had made a similar point years earlier in his dissenting
opinion in Mapp v. Ohio: "The pressures brought to bear against an accused leading to a
confession, unlike an unconstitutional violation of privacy, do not, apart from the use of the
confession at trial, necessarily involve independent Constitutional violations." 367 U.S. 643,
684-85 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). In Mapp, over Harlan's strong dissent, the Court first
applied the exclusionary rule to the states. Id. at 660. In Quarles, discussed in Part I.D, supra,
the Court held that there was a "public safety" exception to Miranda, a position with which
Marshall strenuously disagreed. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1985); id. at 674
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
205 Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
206 494 U.S. 259 (1990) (holding that the Fourth Amendment did not apply to the search
by American authorities of the Mexican residence of a Mexican citizen who had no voluntary
attachment to the United States). The case is discussed in some detail in Godsey, The New
Frontier, supra note 199.
207 See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 184.
208 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 264.
209 Id.
210 270 F.3d 852 (9th Cir. 2001),.cert. granted sub nom. Chavez v. Martinez, 122 S. Ct.
2326 (2002).
211 The suit was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Martinez, 270 F.3d at 854.
212 Id. at 855.
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resulting statements are not used against the suspect at a later trial.2 13
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court's statements, in
Verdugo-Urquidez, that a Fifth Amendment violation occurs only at trial,
but it characterized those statements as uncontrolling dicta.214 The Su-
preme Court has now granted certiorari in Martinez and thus will itself
resolve the question whether the language in Verdugo-Urquidez means
that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by coercive questioning
itself.2 15
Should the Supreme Court affirm the Ninth Circuit, 216 finding that
coercive questioning itself violates the Fifth Amendment, that arguably
"expansive" view of the Fifth Amendment would not benefit nonresident
aliens questioned abroad, so long as the statements were not introduced
into evidence at a trial in this country. The Supreme Court has "rejected
the claim that aliens are entitled to Fifth Amendment rights outside the
sovereign territory of the United States." '217
The Supreme Court will most likely reject the Ninth Circuit's inter-
pretation, however,218 supporting Judge Sand's analysis that the Fifth
Amendment itself is not violated if statements are not introduced at
trial. 2t 9 The question remains: Does it violate the Fifth Amendment to
213 Id. at 857. The court relied on its earlier decision in Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220
(9th Cir. 1992) (en banc). See also Cal. Attorneys for Criminal Justice v. Butts, 195 F.3d 1039
(9th Cir. 2000).
214 Martinez, 270 F.3d at 857 n.3. The Ninth Circuit went on to find that a confession
obtained by coercive questioning also violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Id. at 859.
215 Chavez v. Martinez, 122 S. Ct. 2326 (2002) (granting certiorari). As this article was
going to press, the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Chavez, reversing the Ninth Circuit and
confirming that coercive questioning does not violate the Self-Incrimination Clause absent the
use of the suspect's compelled statements in criminal case against him. See Chavez v. Marti-
nez, 2003 WL 21210419 (May 27, 2003).
216 I think this is unlikely. As Judge Sand noted in Bin Laden, "if the Fifth Amendment
injury resulted from the forcible extraction of a statement and not its later evidentiary use -
then no statute compelling witness testimony under grants of immunity could withstand consti-
tutional challenge." United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 161, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
For a thorough discussion of this issue, see Godsey, Miranda's Final Frontier, supra note 3, at
1721.
217 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990) (citing cases). Of
course, one could also argue that the Fifth Amendment can actually be violated twice: once
when unwarned statements are taken, and another time if those statements are admitted into
evidence against the defendant at trial. See, e.g., Weisselberg, In the Stationhouse After Dick-
erson, supra note 127, at 1159 n.203. Again, however, even were the Supreme Court to accept
this notion, nonresident aliens would not be protected by the Fifth Amendment if questioned
by U.S. agents overseas, unless resulting statements were also introduced at an eventual U.S.
trial.
218 See Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 691 (1993) (describing Miranda's protections
as a fundamental trial right); Godsey, The New Frontier, supra note 199, (noting the slim
chance that the Court in Martinez would hold that the Fifth Amendment can be violated before
statements are actually introduced at trial).
219 See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 185.
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introduce into evidence at trial a statement, taken by American agents
abroad, that was not preceded by Miranda warnings?
C. CREATING A FOREIGN INTERROGATION EXCEPTION TO MIRANDA
The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person ... shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."220 Miranda,
as discussed above, presumes that any statement given without the bene-
fit of the warnings is compelled. That presumption - probably because
it is so problematic to begin with - often breaks down in practice. As
discussed above, for example, the Court has created a "public safety"
exception to Miranda. In addition, lower courts have admitted into evi-
dence statements made to foreign police that were not preceded by the
warnings,221 so long as the statements were actually voluntary (as op-
posed to being simply "presumptively compelled" under Miranda).222
The rationale for admitting such statements into evidence in American
courts, despite the lack of warnings, is that "the Miranda requirements
were primarily designed to prevent United States police officers from
relying on improper interrogation techniques" 223 and have "little, if any,
deterrent effect upon foreign police officers. '224
Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question of
the admissibility of a statement taken by foreign authorities that was not
preceded by American-style Miranda warnings, it would almost certainly
approve the lower courts' reasoning on this point. Those cases are con-
sistent with other Supreme Court cases holding that the presumption of
compulsion does not always apply. As George C. Thomas III has put it:
"The Court chooses sometimes not to apply the Miranda presumption of
compulsion even though 'actual' compulsion would produce an outcome
in favor of the defendant. '225
If statements taken without Miranda warnings truly amounted to
"compulsion" forbidden by the Fifth Amendment, then the question
whether exclusion would "deter" misconduct should be irrelevant, and
unwarned statements taken by either American or foreign police should
be excluded. Unlike the exclusionary sanction in connection with the
Fourth Amendment, which does not by its terms require that evidence
220 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
221 See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972); Kilday v. United
States, 481 F.2d 655, 656 (5th Cir. 1973). The Welch decision is discussed in some detail in
Godsey, The New Frontier, supra note 199.
222 However, after the Supreme Court's decision in Colorado v. Connelly, it is possible
that even "really involuntary" statements taken by foreign agents might be admissible, so long
as U.S. agents were not involved. See infra Part I.D.
223 Welch, 455 F.2d at 213.
224 Id.
225 Thomas, supra note 145, at 1085.
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seized in an illegal search be excluded,226 the Fifth Amendment by its
terms forbids the introduction into evidence of "compelled" testimony.
Miranda presumes compulsion where it does not necessarily exist, how-
ever. As Justice O'Connor recently wrote in a powerful dissenting opin-
ion in Withrow v. Williams:
Because Miranda "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth
Amendment itself," it excludes some confessions even
though the Constitution would not .... Miranda's over-
breadth, of course, is not without justification .... But,
like the exclusionary rule for illegally seized evidence,
Miranda's prophylactic rule does so at a substantial cost.
Unlike involuntary or compelled statements, which are
of dubious reliability and are therefore inadmissible for
any purpose,227 confessions obtained in violation of Mi-
randa are not necessarily untrustworthy. In fact, be-
cause voluntary statements are "trustworthy" even when
obtained without proper warnings, their suppression ac-
tually impairs the pursuit of truth by concealing proba-
tive information from the trier of fact.22 8
The juxtaposition of the Court's recent Miranda and due process
jurisprudence22 9 might lead to the bizarre result that unreliable confes-
sions extracted by foreign agents using brute force would be admissible
as evidence in American courts,230 whereas reliable and voluntary con-
fessions taken by U.S. agents who failed to give Miranda warnings
would be inadmissible. Whether Miranda warnings were given should
not be the sine qua non for the admissibility of statements made in re-
sponse to foreign interrogation, however.231 Rather, the Court should
focus on the historic concern for reliability and have a healthy regard for
the demands of national security in this context.
While the Miranda decision was recently reaffirmed, the Court ex-
plicitly acknowledged its mutability.232 Cases involving foreign interro-
226 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
227 The notion that a statement's "unreliability" makes it inadmissible for any purpose
appears to contradict the Court's opinion in Connelly, discussed infra Part III.D. Interestingly,
however, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion in Connelly, which was
joined by O'Connor, joined O'Connor's dissent in Withrow.
228 Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 702-03 (1993) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). In Withrow, a 5-4 majority of the Court held that alleged violations of
Miranda are cognizable on habeas review.
229 With regard to the Court's due process jurisprudence, see especially Connelly, dis-
cussed infra Part III.D.
230 See infra Part Il.
231 See United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1972) (using phrase "sine qua
non").
232 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441 (2000).
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gation of terrorism suspects present a situation ripe for another Miranda
exception. The need for information in such cases is even more pressing
than was the need for information in Quarles. In Quarles the police
needed to locate a gun that they believed the suspect had discarded in a
grocery store; in cases in which U.S. agents travel overseas to interrogate
terrorism suspects, the stakes are potentially much higher. Agents should
be able to question suspects freely in such circumstances, without the
constraints of Miranda and without having to establish that, before ques-
tioning began, there was an immediate safety concern that justified dis-
pensing with Miranda under Quarles. In cases involving foreign
interrogation of suspected terrorists, the courts should not require agents
to advise suspects of Miranda rights, regardless of the citizenship of the
suspect.
This new exception could be squared with the Court's Miranda-
Quarles-Dickerson jurisprudence. While the Dickerson Court noted that
Miranda "concluded that the coercion inherent in custodial interrogation
blurs the line between voluntary and involuntary statements," 233 Dicker-
son did not reiterate Miranda's claim that all unwarned statements will
be presumed compelled. Indeed, it could not have done so; Quarles is
squarely to the contrary. Rather, the Court's primary rationale for reaf-
firming Miranda was stare decisis.234 Miranda, however, dealt only
with domestic questioning in routine criminal cases; foreign interrogation
was not at issue, much less foreign interrogation of terrorism suspects.
Accordingly, Supreme Court doctrine in no way requires extending the
"warnings requirement" beyond those circumstances in which it has al-
ready been applied.
Without a foreign interrogation exception, American agents investi-
gating terrorism may be forced to choose between intelligence-gathering
in the broad interests of preventing future attacks and evidence-gathering
233 Id. at 435.
234 Id. at 443 ("Whether or not this Court would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its
rule in the first instance, stare decisis weighs heavily against overruling it now."); see The
Supreme Court 1999 Term - Leading Cases, 114 HARV. L. REV. 179, 200 (2000) (noting that
the Court's failure to acknowledge Miranda's core substantive holding "left the Dickerson
Court with no firmer ground for the protection of Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights than the
half-hearted assertion that Miranda has become a national habit"). Academics have speculated
that the majority opinion reflected an uneasy compromise. See Dripps, supra note 16, at 3
("The fact that Chief Justice Rehnquist, for decades an implacable critic of Miranda, wrote the
majority opinion, is ... a sure sign of a compromise opinion, intentionally written to say less
rather than more, for the sake of achieving a strong majority on the narrow question of Mi-
randa's continued vitality.") (footnote omitted); cf Yale Kamisar, From Miranda to § 3501 to
Dickerson to .... Foreword to Symposium, supra note 175, at 889 (speculating that Chief
Justice Rehnquist "may have decided that the best resolution of Dickerson would be a
compromise").
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for the purpose of bringing criminals to justice.235 This is an untenable
dilemma. In the name of upholding purported constitutional rights,
American agents may have a perverse incentive to turn suspected ter-
rorists over to foreign agents, who may be under no constraints regarding
the use of physical force or brutality, rather than risk the exclusion of
non-Mirandized statements taken by American law enforcement repre-
sentatives. In such a case, the prophylactic goals of Miranda backfire,
although the Fifth Amendment itself poses no such dilemma.
The Fifth Amendment prohibits compelled statements, of course,
and if statements are truly involuntary, they should be excluded on that
basis. Unwarned statements are of a different order. George C. Thomas
III has argued, compellingly, that the requirement for Miranda warnings
is better understood as a requirement for due process notice than as a
Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause requirement. 236 I would ar-
gue, moreover, that the Court's post-Miranda "involuntary confession"
cases should have been analyzed under the auspices of the Self-Incrimi-
nation Clause, because that clause specifically forbids "compelled" testi-
mony. Instead, even after Miranda, the Court has deemed "truly
compelled" statements a violation of due process, relegating the Self-
Incrimination Clause to a mere backdrop to the resolution of Miranda
claims.
III. THE COURT'S POST-MIRANDA DUE PROCESS
JURISPRUDENCE: IMPLICATIONS IN
THE TERRORIST CASES
In cases in which the government complies with the dictates of Mi-
randa, or when Miranda does not apply, confessions still may be sup-
pressed if judged "involuntary" under a traditional due process
235 See United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ("To the
extent that a suspect's Miranda rights allegedly impede foreign intelligence collection, we note
that Miranda only prevents an unwarned or involuntary statement from being used as evidence
in a domestic trial; it does not mean that such statements are never to be elicited in the first
place."). In the Lindh case, the government explicitly argued that military questioning done
for the purpose of gathering military intelligence is not governed by Miranda. See Darmer,
supra note 10, at 280 n. 277. While this is almost certainly true, the foreign interrogation
exception proposed here would go beyond military questioning. I do not share Judge Sand's
apparent sanguinity about the prospect of the government forgoing the chance to use evidence
at trial in the interests of gathering intelligence. See Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 189.
236 But see Susan R. Klein, Miranda's Exceptions in a Post-Dickerson World, 91 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 567, 569 passim (2001) (disagreeing with Thomas).
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analysis. 237 Indeed, with the erosion of Miranda,238 one scholar has de-
scribed the voluntariness test as the "central gatekeeper in determining
the admissibility of confessions in an increasing number of
circumstances. 239
Yale Kamisar, one of the most influential scholars in the area of
confessions law, 240 predicted explicitly that the government would have
trouble overcoming the due process voluntariness requirement in the
Lindh case. 24' Because of Lindh's eventual guilty plea, Kamisar's
prognostications - made several months before the government had re-
sponded to Lindh's allegations - were never tested. However, an exam-
ination of Lindh's due process claims is useful for purposes of
addressing the implications of due process requirements in future terror-
ist cases.
A. THE LINDH CASE
On July 15, 2002, a citizen of the United States described as the
American Taliban, John Walker Lindh, pleaded guilty to supplying ser-
vices to the Taliban and to carrying explosives during the commission of
a felony. 242 The plea obviated the need for the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia to rule on Lindh's motion to suppress state-
ments made to U.S. authorities who interrogated him in Afghanistan.
Lindh's motion to suppress had alleged violations of his Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and due process rights.243
In alleging violations of his due process rights, Lindh described
conditions he endured in Afghanistan that, in his view, rendered his
statements to American authorities involuntary. Lindh argued that his
statements were "extracted by techniques the U.S. Supreme Court has
unequivocally condemned," including "incommunicado detention; food,
sleep, and sensory deprivation; denial of a timely presentment before a
magistrate; denial of clothing and proper medical care; humiliation, and
237 See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434 ("We have never abandoned this due process jurispru-
dence, and thus continue to exclude confessions that were obtained involuntarily."); see also
United States v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (noting, after rejecting respondent's Miranda
argument, that he "is certainly free on remand to argue that his statement was coerced under
traditional due process standards").
238 See supra Part I.D.
239 Lunney, supra note 30, at 787.
240 See Cassell, The Paths Not Taken, supra note 152, at 900 (2001) (describing Kamisar
as "preeminent academic defender of Miranda"). Indeed, Kamisar is credited with having
influenced the direction taken by the Supreme Court in the Miranda decision. See Scott W.
Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal Procedure: From
Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 399-401 (2001).
241 See Yale Kamisar, More than Miranda, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 25, 2002, at 51.
242 Plea Agreement, para. 1, United States v. Lindh, No. CR 02-37-A (E.D. Va. 2002).
243 Issues related to his privilege against self-incrimination are the subject of the first
article in this series, Darmer, supra note 10.
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failure to inform Mr. Lindh of his rights."'2 "4 Lindh relied upon, among
other cases, Brain, Ashcraft, Spano, Watts, Rogers, and Culombe.245
In making his factual allegations, 246 Lindh argued that he suffered
terribly at the hands of the Northern Alliance troops before the United
States ever took him into custody. Those troops had a reputation for
brutality and torture, including the use of "mutilation, castration and
rape."'247 While a prisoner of the Northern Alliance, Lindh was shot and
imprisoned in a basement, where "soldiers poured fuel down several air
ducts," then lighted it, and fired several large rockets, killing many pris-
oners.248 Later, the Northern Alliance soldiers flooded the basement
with cold water, drowning other prisoners. 249 Eventually, "[w]ounded,
starved, frozen and exhausted," Lindh emerged from the basement on
December 1, 2001, with about eighty-five other survivors of the 300 pris-
oners who had arrived with him.250 American forces ultimately took
custody of Lindh and transported him to Camp Rhino.
Lindh alleged that U.S. forces then provided him with inadequate
food and medical care, 25' failed to apprise him of his constitutional
rights,252 and subjected him to taunts and abuse. 253 At Camp Rhino, he
alleged, U.S. forces bound him, naked and blindfolded, with duct tape to
a stretcher, then placed him in a windowless metal shipping container. 254
Lindh made statements to a CNN reporter and to various U.S. interro-
gators, which he alleged were involuntary. In those statements, in sub-
stance, he acknowledged fighting with the Taliban, training at an al
Qaeda terrorist training camp and meeting Usama bin Laden. It was his
understanding that bin Laden had ordered the September 11 attacks,
which Lindh learned about by radio on September 11 or 12.255
The United States sharply disputed Lindh's claim that his state-
ments were in any way involuntary. 256 Specifically, the government ar-
244 Involuntary Statements Mem., supra note 5, at 1.
245 See generally id. See supra Part l.A-B, in which these cases are discussed in detail.
246 See generally Proffer of Facts in Support of Defendant's Suppression Motions, United
States v. Lindh, No. CR 02-37-A (E.D. Va. 2002) (filed June 13, 2002) [hereinafter Lindh's
Proffer].
247 Id. at 2-3.
248 Id. at 9.
249 Id. at 9-10.
250 Id. at 10.
251 Id. at 15.
252 Id. at 14. The government's alleged failure to apprise Lindh of his Miranda rights is
discussed extensively in Darmer, supra note 10.
253 Lindh's Proffer, supra note 246, at 17.
254 Id. at 18.
255 For a fuller description of Lindh's statements, see Darmer, supra note 10, at 252.
256 See generally Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Suppress Involun-
tary Statements, United States v. Lindh, No. CR 02-37-A (E.D. Va. 2002) (served July 1,
2002) [hereinafter Gov't's Opp'n].
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gued, inter alia, that the United States had not engaged in coercive
conduct, 257 that Lindh was eager to talk, spoke freely and was never
subjected to lengthy periods of interrogation,25 8 and that Lindh's priva-
tions were the inevitable consequences of war.2 5 9
B. THE DE FACTO DILUTION OF DUE PROCESS
Despite the continued existence of the old due process voluntariness
test, few would disagree that its practical significance has diminished in
the post-Miranda world. With courts primarily focused on questions of
warnings and waivers under Miranda, the question of voluntariness
serves as a "backup" test that is increasingly difficult to meet. As the
Court noted in Berkemer v. McCarty: "We do not suggest that compli-
ance with Miranda conclusively establishes the voluntariness of a subse-
quent confession. But cases in which a defendant can make a colorable
claim that a self-incriminating statement was 'compelled' despite the fact
that law enforcement authorities adhered to the dictates of Miranda are
rare."'260 Indeed. As Louis Michael Seidman pointed out in 1994, the
Supreme Court had at that time "reversed only two convictions on the
ground that post-Miranda custodial interrogation produced an involun-
tary statement."'2 6' No additional Supreme Court reversals have been
forthcoming in the eight years since the Seidman piece was published.
In sharp contrast, the Court had reversed twenty-three convictions based
on involuntary confessions "in the comparable time period immediately
preceding Miranda.'2 62 With the Supreme Court now turning a virtual
blind eye to circumstances that might have led to a reversal under the due
process standard before Miranda, "many lower courts have adopted an
attitude towards voluntariness claims that can only be called cavalier. '2 63
Thus, it appears to be an unintended consequence of Miranda that a
decision widely viewed as protective of the rights of defendants has actu-
ally resulted in the wider admission of confessions under both state and
257 Id. at 10-11.
258 Id. at 12-13, 15-16.
259 Id. at 21-24.
260 468 U.S. 420, 433 n.20 (1984). The Court held in that case that the Miranda warnings
need not be given in connection with roadside questioning during a routine traffic stop.
261 Seidman, supra note 8, at 745 (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978)).
262 Id.; see also Welsh S. White, Miranda's Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation
Practices, 99 MIcH. L. REV. 1211, 1220 n.57 (2001) (collecting cases).
263 Seidman, supra note 8, at 745-46.
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federal law.2 64 Looking back at the facts of Bram,265 for example, it is
highly unlikely that such facts would lead to the suppression of a confes-
sion today. Of course, Bram was decided explicitly under the Self-In-
crimination Clause, and not under the Due Process Clause. However, the
Bram Court used the language of "voluntariness," 12 66 the central inquiry
in a due process analysis, in finding that a confession should be sup-
pressed if influenced in any way by pressure being brought to bear upon
the suspect. 267 If Lindh's case had been governed by the standard articu-
lated in Bram, he would have had a compelling case for suppression.
But the fact is that the Court does not now define an "involuntary confes-
sion" in the way that it did in Brain. In short, it appears that the Supreme
Court reads the constitutional protections of suspects more narrowly now
than it did in 1897.268
One explanation of this seeming anomaly was recently articulated
by George C. Thomas III in his article about the consequences of the
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment. 269
Thomas argues that the role of incorporation has been "largely hidden"
in the "steadily diminishing scope" of criminal procedure rights.270 Once
264 See White, Miranda's Failure. supra note 262, at 1219 ("Ironically, Miranda's practi-
cal limitations have derived from the fact that Miranda effectively reduced the efficacy of the
due process voluntariness test."); id. at 1246 ("Miranda may have had the unintended effect of
reducing the extent to which the due process voluntariness test provides protection."); see also
Stuntz, supra note 155, at 976 ("Miranda imposes only the slightest of costs on the police, and
its existence may well forestall more serious, and more successful, regulation of police ques-
tioning."); cf Seidman, supra note 8, at 746 (arguing that Miranda "traded the promise of
substantial reform implicit in prior doctrine for a political symbol" because it was politically
"impoten[t]" to "make good on the promise of Culombe, Massiah, and Escobedo").
265 See discussion supra Part I.A.
266 See id.
267 Scholars disagree about whether an "involuntary" or "coerced" confession under the
Due Process Clause means the same thing as a "compelled confession" under the Fifth
Amendment. See Alschuler, supra note 22, at 2627 n.6 (discussing work of Stephen J.
Schulhofer); Schulhofer, Fifth Amendment Exceptionalism, supra note 145, at 944 ("Compul-
sion cannot mean involuntariness."); Thomas, supra note 145, at 1085 n.19 (stating that, in
reference to Schulhofer's work, "Commentators have sought to draw differences between in-
voluntary, compelled, and coerced statements."). However, as Thomas also points out,
"Whatever the common law approach, or the best philosophical approach, the Court today
treats all three as synonymous." Id. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 307 (1985); New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 n.5 (1984)).
268 See infra note 309 and accompanying text; cf George E. Dix, Federal Constitutional
Confession Law: The 1986 and 1987 Supreme Court Terms, 67 TEX. L. REV. 231, 346 (1988)
("The Supreme Court's 1986 and 1987 Term cases continued the trend toward narrowing the
protections afforded criminal suspects and defendants under federal constitutional confession
law.").
269 See George C. Thomas 1II, When Constitutional Worlds Collide: Resurrecting the
Framers' Bill of Rights and Criminal Procedure, 100 MICH. L. REv. 145 (2001).
270 Id. at 148. Thomas makes a compelling historical argument for the case that the rela-
tively restrictive Bill of Rights, parts of which were only recently applied to the states through
Fourteenth Amendment incorporation, was borne of a profound distrust of the federal govern-
ment that did not extend to state governments. Those rights were never intended to fetter the
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that occurred, "the Court has never had the appetite to apply the provi-
sions to the States as rigorously as it had applied them against the federal
government. '271 So instead, the Court has applied a "watered-down"
version to the states, and it is that diluted version that then gets applied,
even in federal cases, and even when that means ignoring prior federal
precedent interpreting the Bill of Rights more robustly.272
While Thomas's work does not focus specifically on the impact of
incorporation on the Fifth Amendment, 273 an examination of cases de-
cided since Bram provides strong support for his views. In 1897, the
Court ruled definitively that the circumstances surrounding Bram's con-
fession - circumstances that were hardly onerous by later standards -
rendered that confession inadmissible as a violation of Bram's Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination. 274 Bram has never been ex-
plicitly overruled 275 and, in fact, is widely cited, though the facts of the
case get scarce treatment by modern courts. The fact is that Bram has
been de facto overruled, in the sense that if the facts arose today, they
would not warrant suppression under the Court's more modern confes-
sions jurisprudence. 276
Moreover, the "reflection back" of weakened rights for suspects in
federal prosecutions may be quite palatable to the courts - and society
state governments, which had to contend with garden-variety criminal matters. In a statement
that was doubtless more true before the events of September 11, 2001, Thomas asserts that
"[t]he crimes Americans fear most - everyday property crimes and crimes of violence -
have always been the responsibility of local police and prosecutors." Id. at 173. Elsewhere in
his article, Thomas acknowledges that the September 11 attacks will naturally lead to ques-
tions regarding his claims that a stricter interpretation of the Bill of Rights in the federal
criminal arena would not "unduly burden" federal law enforcement. Id. at 174.
271 Id. at 148.
272 In Thomas's words:
Think of the Fourteenth Amendment as a lens projecting the Bill of Rights upon the
States. For the criminal procedure guarantees, the lens is also a mirror. As the lens
projects fundamental rights versions of the criminal procedure guarantees onto the
States, it also reflects back onto the Bill of Rights, distorting their purpose as a
barrier against federal prosecutors and judges. The original Bill of Rights criminal
procedure guarantees - intended to establish a high wall with a narrow gate - has
been reduced to an annoying speed bump on a broad interstate that leads to a set of
more or less accurate outcomes.
Id. at 151-52.
273 Most of Thomas's specific examples involve the Fourth and Sixth amendments. See,
e.g., id. at 174, 222-30.
274 Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
275 However, as Welsh S. White has pointed out, "the majority went out of its way to
repudiate Bram" in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991). White, What Is an Involun-
tary Confession Now?, supra note 53, at 2016 (citing Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 285); see infra
note 309 and accompanying text; see also White, Miranda's Failure, supra note 262, at 1234
(2001) (noting that in Fulminante, "the Court expressly repudiated Bram's holding prohibiting
confessions induced by any promises, stating that the rule 'does not state the standard for
determining the voluntariness of a confession' ").
276 See White, Miranda's Failure, supra note 262, at 1234.
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- in a post-September 11 world. We are in an era of high expectations
for aggressive law enforcement. 277 The dictates of due process will
likely be read even more narrowly in this context, and that is as it should
be. Although Thomas implicitly criticizes the "watered-down" version
of rights now being applied in both state and federal courts, 278 many of
the Court's pre-Miranda confessions cases, particularly those that sought
to vindicate the "autonomy" of the suspect, were not firmly grounded in
constitutional principles and were theoretically unsound.279
C. THE COURT'S POST-MIRANDA TREATMENT OF "COMPELLED
STATEMENTS" UNDER THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE RATHER THAN
THE SELF-INCRIMINATION CLAUSE
Despite holding in Miranda that the Self-Incrimination Clause for-
bids the use of compelled confessions, the Court has since relied on that
clause as a basis for exclusion only in cases that implicate Miranda.
When the defendant relies on the argument that his confession was "actu-
ally compelled" or "involuntary," the Supreme Court has continued to
apply the due process voluntariness test, despite the fact, as Mark God-
sey puts it, that "from textual and doctrinal standpoints, the privilege
[against self-incrimination] seems the more appropriate provision with
which to regulate confessions, as it speaks directly to the issue of com-
pulsory self-incrimination, while the Due Process Clauses are silent on
the matter. '280
Since Miranda went into effect, 281 the Supreme Court has analyzed
the admission of confessions under the pre-existing due process volunta-
riness test on three occasions: 282 in Mincey v. Arizona,283 Colorado v.
Connelly,284 and Arizona v. Fulminante.2 85 The confessions were
277 Cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 465 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting that "'the govern-
ment has no more profound responsibility' than the protection of American citizens from fur-
ther terrorist attacks").
278 See generally Thomas, When Constitutional Worlds Collide, supra note 269.
279 See Seidman, supra note 8, at 686 (discussing political instability of cases grounded in
the concern for individual self-determination); see also Penney, supra note 23, at 313 (noting
that self-determination theory is "morally suspect").
280 Godsey, The New Frontier, supra note 199.
281 Because Miranda did not apply retroactively to trials that commenced before the deci-
sion was rendered, the due process voluntariness test continued to be the test for admissibility
of confessions in cases such as Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966).
282 See White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, supra note 53, at 2014-15.
283 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
284 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
285 499 U.S. 279 (1991). In addition, in Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985), the Court
held that the "voluntariness" of a confession is a legal question, rather than a factual one,
which is to be independently considered in a federal habeas proceeding.
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deemed inadmissible in Mincey2 86 and Fulminante287 but admissible in
Connelly.288 Those cases suggest that:
[T]he post-Miranda due process test is essentially identi-
cal to the pre-Miranda test. As under the old test, con-
fessions induced by force, threats of force, promises of
protection from force, or by excessively lengthy continu-
ous interrogations are involuntary. When these extreme
techniques are absent, however, the voluntariness of a
confession is determined on the basis of a totality of cir-
cumstances test, under which a court must assess both
the interrogators' practices and the suspect's individual
characteristics for the purpose of determining whether
the suspect's will was overborne. 289
Mincey involved a rather classic example of police overreaching 290
in which a confession was taken from a suspect who had been shot by the
police and was lying in a hospital bed in extreme pain.29' Fulminante,292
a closer case,2 93 involved a confession made by a suspect to a fellow
inmate who was a police informer posing as a member of organized
crime and offering "protection" to Fulminante2 94 in exchange for a
confession. 295
Lindh sought to rely on Mincey in suggesting that his own confes-
sion was not voluntarily made.296 That case provided the Court's first
post-Miranda opportunity to address the question of the implications of a
truly "involuntary" confession, as opposed to a confession simply viola-
tive of Miranda. Noting that Mincey was seriously wounded, depressed,
confused, and "encumbered by a tubes, needles, and breathing appara-
tus," the Court concluded that "[i]t is hard to imagine a situation less
286 437 U.S. at 401-02.
287 499 U.S. at 302.
288 479 U.S. at 170-71.
289 White, Miranda's Failure, supra note 262, at 1218 (citations omitted).
290 See White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, supra note 53, at 2015 ("Mincey
v. Arizona provides a stark example of a case in which the police refused to honor the sus-
pect's decision to remain silent.").
291 437 U.S. at 396, 398-99.
292 The case is perhaps best known for extending the "harmless error rule" to cases in
which involuntary confessions have been improperly admitted. That portion of the opinion
was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by four other justices. Fulminante, 499
U.S. at 302-03, 306-12. That aspect of the case has received extensive academic treatment.
See, e.g., Kenneth R. Kenkel, Note, Arizona v. Fulminante: Where's the Harm in Harmless
Error?, 81 Ky. L.J. 257 (1992).
293 See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 287.
294 Fulminante was suspected of having sexually assaulted and killed his stepdaughter and
therefore had reason to fear "tough treatment" by other inmates. See id. at 282-83.
295 Id. at 286.
296 Involuntary Statements Mem., supra note 5, at 10.
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conducive to the exercise of 'a rational intellect and free will"' than
Mincey's. 297 A detective gave him Miranda warnings but persisted in
interrogation despite Mincey's repeated requests for an attorney. 298 The
statements were used against Mincey to impeach his testimony at trial. 299
The Court noted that "[s]tatements made by a defendant in circumstances
violating the strictures of Miranda v. Arizona ... are admissible for im-
peachment if their 'trustworthiness ... satisfies legal standards.'1,300 Re-
lying on the Court's pre-Miranda due process confessions jurisprudence,
however, the Court held that "any criminal trial use against a defendant
of his involuntary statement is a denial of due process of law."' 0'
Consistent with Miranda's theory that custodial interrogation impli-
cates the Self-Incrimination Clause, the Court could have found that any
trial use of Mincey's statements violated his right to be free of compelled
self-incrimination. Instead, it grounded the exclusion entirely on the Due
Process Clause. By focusing exclusively on the presence or absence of
Miranda warnings in its interpretation of the Self-Incrimination Clause,
the Court requires both too little and too much.30 2 Were the Court to
focus on real compulsion, its application of the Self-Incrimination Clause
to interrogation would be constitutionally principled. The Court has not
yet, however, clearly defined "compulsion" in the context of police inter-
rogation.30 3 The Court may prefer the due process test to the privilege
because it is perceived as more flexible.3°4
297 437 U.S. at 398-99.
298 Id. at 396.
299 Id. at 397.
300 Id. at 397-98 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971)).
301 Id. at 398.
302 Cf. Thomas, Separated at Birth, supra note 145, at 1102 ("It seems odd, at best, to say
that the Fifth Amendment requires suspects to be warned that they have a privilege not to
answer police questions, but that once they agree to answer, they are in the due process soup
where police can lie and cheat to get a confession. This view of the Fifth Amendment impov-
erishes it.").
303 Cf. Godsey, The New Frontier, supra note 199 ("Although the Court has not given
clear guidance on the meaning of 'compulsion' in the police interrogation context, it has
clearly defined this term in the context of formal proceedings, such as trial or congressional
hearings."). In his forthcoming article, Godsey goes on to formulate an "objectively identifi-
able penalty test" that would reconcile notions of "compulsion" in the interrogation context
with notions of "compulsion" in other formal settings. See id. I would define compulsion in
the interrogation context more narrowly than does Godsey, but a full discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this article.
304 See Herman, The Unexplored Relationship (Part II), supra note 22, at 521 (noting that
"a plausible explanation" for Chief Justice Rehnquist's pointing out in Connelly that the Court
has retained a due process focus is that Rehnquist "perceives due process as a significantly less
stringent limitation on police interrogation because it permits balancing in the ordinary crimi-
nal context").
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D. WAS LINDH'S STATEMENT INVOLUNTARY? DUE PROCESS LIMITS
ON CONFESSIONS IN AN AGE OF TERROR
The Court is unlikely to abandon its due process jurisprudence in
the conceivable future. Therefore, it is useful to analyze Lindh's claims
under a traditional due process analysis. Lindh's reliance on Mincey
likely would have been unavailing. Unlike in Mincey, it is doubtful that
a court would have found that repeated requests for counsel were ig-
nored. 305 And unlike Mincey, Lindh was not shot at the hands of the
same government that later tried to question him. Rather, Lindh was
wounded in the theater of war.
In terms of Lindh's allegations regarding being in pain, the recent
Second Circuit case of United States v. Khalil306 is instructive. In that
case, the court allowed a confession given under circumstances in which
the defendant was shot and wounded by police, then questioned in the
hospital while he was in pain, then questioned later "intermittently" be-
tween "several post-surgical procedures." 30 7 The Second Circuit af-
firmed the decision of the district court, which credited the agent's
testimony that "although Abu Mezer [the defendant] was in pain, he was
alert, seemed to understand the agent's questions, and gave responsive
answers. '308 Under this rationale, the fact that Lindh may have been in
pain did not automatically render his confession involuntary. And while
Khalil is not a Supreme Court opinion, it seems highly likely that the
Court would adopt its reasoning. Moreover, Lindh was wounded at the
hands of the Northern Alliance - not the United States. After Connelly,
discussed infra, courts likely will focus exclusively on conduct by the
U.S. government in assessing due process voluntariness in cases such as
Lindh's.
The Supreme Court wrote in Fulminante: "Although the Court
noted in Bram that a confession cannot be obtained by 'any direct or
implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper
influence' . . . this passage from Bram ... under current precedent does
not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a confes-
sion."' 309 While a "credible threat" of violence renders a confession in-
305 Matters related to Lindh's allegations regarding request for counsel are discussed more
fully in Darmer, supra note 10.
306 214 F.3d IIl (2d Cir. 2000).
307 Id. at 122.
308 Id. at 121. The court analyzed the afternoon statements separately, affirming the ad-
mission of those statements based largely on testimony that Abu Mezer "appeared to under-
stand his rights." Id. at 122. With regard to both sets of statements, the court further ruled that
any error in their admission was harmless. See id. at 122.
309 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991) (citations omitted). Of course, Bram
was decided under the Fifth Amendment privilege, while Fulminante involved the Due Pro-
cess Clause. The broad language of Bram, however, simply no longer applies to confessions
in either context.
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voluntary,310 lesser circumstances - such as those outlined in Bram -
do not.
Standing as a particularly formidable barrier to an involuntariness
claim in circumstances like Lindh's is Colorado v. Connelly.311 In that
case, the Court explicitly held that "coercive police activity is a neces-
sary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 'voluntary' within
the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. ' 312 In that case, the defendant, suffering from mental delusions,
walked into a police station and confessed to a murder, but the defen-
dant's mental state did not render his confession "involuntary" under the
Court's test.313 The Court specifically found that "the Fifth Amendment
privilege is not concerned 'with moral and psychological pressures to
confess emanating from sources other than official coercion.'"314 More-
over, "[a]bsent police conduct causally related to the confession, there is
simply no basis for concluding that any state actor has deprived a crimi-
nal defendant of due process of law," 315 even if the statements were
"quite unreliable. ' 316 The Court disagreed with the Supreme Court of
Colorado's finding that the admission of the evidence into court was
"sufficient state action" to trigger the Due Process Clause: "The diffi-
culty with [this approach] is that it fails to recognize the essential link
between the coercive activity of the State, on the one hand, and a result-
ing confession by a defendant, on the other. '317
The Connelly Court thus appeared to collapse the traditional "com-
plex of values" underlying the due process voluntariness test 318 into a
single concern: preventing "police overreaching" or "coercive police
conduct."'319 In particular, the Court displayed little constitutional con-
cern for the inherent reliability of the confession at issue.320 Scholars
have criticized the Court for this, particularly in light of the fact that
"reliability" was historically central to the Court's due process
jurisprudence. 321
310 Id. at 287.
311 479 U.S. 157 (1986).
312 Id. at 167.
313 Id. at 160-61, 164-67. For a further discussion of the case, see Dix, supra note 268,
at 244-46.
314 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985) (dis-
cussing standards for waiver of privilege)).
315 Id. at 164.
316 Id. at 167.
317 Id. at 165.
318 See supra Part I.B.
319 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-64.
320 According to the Court, an unreliable confession is a matter to be governed by the law
of evidence, rather than by the Due Process Clause. Id. at 166-67.
321 See Benner, supra note 24, at 141-42 (1989) ("Viewed from the perspective provided
by the historical development of the due process voluntariness doctrine, a lack of trustworthi-
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If the due process clauses prevent the admission into evidence of
only those confessions caused by deterrable police misconduct, then no
conditions or pressure entirely independent of such conduct would render
a confession "involuntary" for purposes of the Constitution. This is true
even if pressure were imposed, externally, by foreign agents, such as
Northern Alliance troops in Afghanistan, 322 rather than by internal psy-
chological conditions, such as those present in Connelly. In the Ninth
Circuit case of United States v. Wo/f,3 2 3 for example, the court suggested
that Connelly "cast into serious doubt" the "continuing vitality" of an
earlier Ninth Circuit case holding that an involuntary confession obtained
by Mexican police would be inadmissible in an American court.324 This
is because, after Connelly, with its emphasis on wrongful, deterrable
state action, there is necessarily no due process violation in the absence
of wrongful conduct by a state actor that U.S. courts can hope to control.
An echo of this theme was played out in the recent Bin Laden case.
In discussing the deterrence of U.S. law enforcement officials from omit-
ting Miranda warnings, the court noted that:
The Government calls it "positively perverse" that the
admissibility of Defendants' statements would not re-
quire any Miranda warnings at all if those statements
were instead the product of questioning by foreign po-
lice. Yet we see nothing at all anomalous in requiring
our own Government to abide by the strictures of our
own Constitution whenever it seeks to convict an ac-
cused, in our own courts, on the basis of admissions
culled via an inherently coercive interrogation conducted
by our own law enforcement. 32 5
While it may not be anomalous to require suppression of un-Mirandized
statements taken by U.S. agents but not require suppression of such state-
ments taken by foreign interrogators, surely it would be perverse to re-
quire suppression of voluntary, reliable, but un-Mirandized statements
taken by U.S. agents but to admit statements taken by foreign agents that
ness should therefore remain a sufficient, but not a necessary condition precedent to a due
process violation. In Connelly, however, the Court obliterated trustworthiness altogether.");
Dix, supra note 268, at 276 ("[A]t least in the absence of more thorough consideration than
Connelly demonstrates, a total deconstitutionalization of traditionally important reliability is-
sues is unjustified.").
322 The situation would be different, of course, if the foreign agents were effectively act-
ing as agents of the United States. In Lindh's case, however, Lindh did not appear to allege
that the Northern Alliance troops under the control of General Dostum were in any way con-
trolled by U.S. forces.
323 813 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1987).
324 Id. at 972 n.3 (citing Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 348 (9th Cir. 1967)).
325 United States v. Bin Laden, 132 F. Supp. 2d 168, 187 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation
omitted).
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were extracted by brute force. Before Connelly, one could have argued
that the introduction into evidence of such statements was itself sufficient
to trigger "state action" calling for due process review. After Connelly,
that argument is foreclosed. 326
In his forthcoming article on the admissibility of confessions taken
by U.S. investigators from non-Americans abroad, 327 Mark Godsey iden-
tifies noncitizens as being particularly vulnerable after Connelly. In his
analysis, he explains that the Connelly Court "converted the due process
involuntary confession rule from a trial right like the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination, to a freestanding civil liberty like the
Fourth Amendment. '328 Noncitizens are not protected by extraterritorial
violations of "freestanding civil liberties," he points out, as demonstrated
in Verdugo-Urquidez, in which the Fourth Amendment did not enable
Mexican nationals to exclude the fruits of a warrantless search conducted
by American authorities in Mexico. 329 Likewise, the Due Process Clause
would not protect a noncitizen from abusive questioning by the FBI
overseas, and a confession resulting from such questioning could be ad-
mitted at trial without violating the Due Process Clause. 330
Similarly, the Due Process Clause would not protect a U.S. citizen
who was brutally interrogated by foreign agents. Perversely, as dis-
cussed more fully, supra, applying Miranda to our agents operating over-
seas may given them an incentive to turn over suspects - American and
foreign - to foreign agents for questioning.
Lindh, of course, was interrogated directly by representatives of the
U.S. government, and as a citizen, he could claim the protections of both
the Fifth Amendment's Self-Incrimination Clause and its Due Process
Clause. As part of his due process argument, however, he suggested that
326 But see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (finding ade-
quate "state action" for purposes of equal protection clause when private civil litigants exer-
cised race-based peremptory challenges within a government courtroom). The rationale of
Edmonson would provide one basis for arguing against the holding of Connelly.
327 See generally Godsey, The New Frontier, supra note 199.
328 Godsey, The New Frontier, supra note 199. Elsewhere, Godsey defines a "freestand-
ing civil liberty" as "not concerned with ensuring fair and accurate trials; rather, it protects
people generally from government overreaching in a variety of non-trial settings - from the
private home to the public street corner. Accordingly, a freestanding civil liberty can be trig-
gered and/or violated in situations outside the criminal trial context." Id.
329 See id.; see also supra note 206 (describing holding of Verdugo-Urquidez).
330 Godsey, The New Frontier, supra note 199 (using the example of an FBI agent located
in Italy extracting a confession from an Italian citizen suspected of trafficking in child pornog-
raphy by depriving him of food and sleep for seventy-two hours: "Because the due process
violation was fully accomplished in Italy, and no separate constitutional deprivation occurred
by the mere introduction of his involuntary confession at trial, his motion to suppress on due
process grounds would not be successful under Verdugo-Urquidez"). Elsewhere, Godsey ar-
gues that the noncitizen is protected by the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, and he develops an "objectively identifiable penalty test" for determining whether a
confession is "compelled" under the Fifth Amendment. Id.
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his treatment at the hands of Northern Alliance forces left him in a weak-
ened condition.331 The problem with this part of his argument is that he
was not "wounded, starved, frozen [or] exhausted" as a result of any
behavior of United States troops. Essentially, Lindh came into United
States custody in a weakened condition not brought about by the United
States, just as Connelly appeared at a stationhouse suffering from delu-
sions not brought about by action of the state police. Under the rationale
of Connelly, if the U.S. agents were not responsible for Lindh's condi-
tion, then they did not violate his due process rights by taking his confes-
sion when he was suffering from that condition. Nor, under Connelly,
would the introduction into evidence of Lindh's confession, standing
alone, violate the strictures of due process.
I do not view this resulting analysis of Lindh's case as particularly
problematic under the Constitution. Even applying a pre-Connelly due
process analysis to the facts of Lindh's confession, it would likely have
been admissible. The confession bore strong earmarks of reliability, for
example. It is not hard to imagine, however, a future situation in which
this might not be the case.
There is another aspect to Lindh's case that bears addressing, how-
ever. To the extent that Lindh's due process arguments also included the
claim that he suffered while in U.S. custody, his arguments would not
have been foreclosed by Connelly. As due process, after Connelly, is
primarily concerned with deterrence, then a critical issue would have
been whether U.S. law enforcement agents engaged in the kind of
"wrongful" tactics that U.S. courts would seek to deter in future cases.
Because Lindh was being interrogated as a wartime detainee, the ques-
tion naturally arises: What does "due process" mean in these circum-
stances? In other words, while Lindh was subjected to relatively harsh
conditions as a result of surrendering on the battlefield, should those
conditions be weighed in the same manner as if Lindh were a conven-
tional suspect subjected to such conditions incident to trying to get a
confession? I submit that they should be weighed differently. 332
This does not appear to be a case, like Ashcraft or Watts, 33 3 in
which the defendant was subjected to unduly long interrogation, where
331 See generally Gov't's Opp'n, supra note 256; see also supra Part III.A.
332 The question naturally arises whether it is only in cases of "foreign interrogation" that
suspected terrorists' due process claims should be looked at under a special lens. I think the
argument can be made that, regardless of the location of interrogation, suspected terrorists
should be treated differently, though that argument goes beyond the scope of this article. It
bears noting, however, that the government has demonstrated a willingness to treat some ter-
rorist suspects as "enemy combatants," motivated, perhaps in part, by a desire to avoid the
constitutional constraints imposed in civilian courts. This point is addressed more fully in
Darmer, supra note 10 at 242-43, 286-87.
333 See supra Part I.B.
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finally his will to resist was broken. Rather, his cooperation was rather
immediately forthcoming. Lindh says, of course, that his cooperation
was motivated by a desire for better treatment - and that such better
treatment was forthcoming after he made statements to U.S. interro-
gators. But Lindh was a wartime captive. His conditions were commen-
surate with his status as a dangerous detainee at war with this country.
Moreover, in terms of food, medical, and sleeping provisions, the gov-
ernment argued that his treatment was equal to or better than that of
American forces. 3 34 If the government's claims are credited, it appears
that Lindh's treatment in this regard was consistent with the requirements
of the Geneva Convention. 335 In assessing "voluntariness" under such
unusual circumstances, the courts should consider the government's le-
gitimate safety concerns, and the constraints imposed by war conditions,
in evaluating whether the government "coerced" suspects like Lindh.336
As with "evolving standards of decency" in the Eighth Amendment
context, 337 one generally thinks of a forward evolution of notions of "due
process," resulting in an increasingly "civilized" treatment of suspects in
custody. When society faces real threats, such as from terrorism, how-
ever, it is much harder for that society to tolerate an expansive view of
the rights of criminal defendants.
Connelly suggests that, in assessing the "voluntariness" of a confes-
sion under the Due Process Clause, a statement should be judged invol-
untary only in instances of police misconduct. But what is "police
misconduct" in the context of interrogating terrorist suspects? Before
Miranda, the Court had not developed bright-line rules about which tac-
tics were in and which were out, other than banning physical abuse. In-
stead, as discussed more fully, supra, the Court's due process line of
cases reflects a mix of values and does not provide clear guidance about
prohibited tactics. Since Miranda, the Court has provided little addi-
tional guidance.
While the Court generally hesitates to prescribe different standards
for different types of crimes, it makes sense to do so in the terrorism
334 See generally Gov't's Opp'n, supra note 256.
335 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Chapter III,
arts. 25, 26, 29 & 30 (21 Oct. 1950), available at http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm
(describing requirements for quarters, food, and medical attention).
336 It should be noted that, in addition to confessing to the FBI, Lindh gave an interview
to CNN on December 2, 2001. See Transcript of John Walker Interview, at http://www.cnn.
comI2001/WORLD/asiapcf/centralI2/20/ret.walker.transcript. Even had some of Lindh's
statements to the government been deemed inadmissible, his statements made to CNN likely
would have been admissible because they were made to a private party not constrained by the
Constitution.
337 Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2247 (2002) (holding that execution of mentally
retarded criminals amounted to "cruel and unusual punishment" "prohibited by Eighth
Amendment).
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context. 338 Consider, for example, language from the Court's opinion in
Rochin v. California,339 which involved the forcible stomach-pumping of
the defendant to remove capsules after agents could not extract them
from his mouth. In that case, the Court said the following:
This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Illegally
breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to
open his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible
extraction of his stomach's contents - this course of
proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence
is bound to offend even the most hardened sensibilities.
They are methods too close to the rack and screw to per-
mit of constitutional differentiation.
It has long since ceased to be true that due process of
law is heedless of the means by which otherwise rele-
vant and credible evidence is obtained. [The confession]
decisions [are] only instances of the general requirement
that States in their prosecutions respect certain decencies
of civilized conduct. Due process of law, as a historic
and generative principle, precludes defining, and thereby
confining, these standards of conduct more precisely
than to say that convictions cannot be brought about by
methods that offend "a sense of justice. 34 °
Would government action that "shocks the conscience" in a case involv-
ing illegal drugs also "shock the conscience" in a case involving terror-
ism? What if, for example, a suspected terrorist swallowed capsules
containing small bits of paper on which appeared code numbers required
to deactivate a bomb? Would it "shock the conscience," then, to pump
his stomach?
338 Cf. Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2000) (addressing the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment) ("The facts of this case do not require us to speculate about the circum-
stances under which the danger alleged in an anonymous tip might be so great as to justify a
search even without a showing of reliability. We do not say, for example, that a report of a
person carrying a bomb need bear the indicia of reliability we demand for a report of a person
carrying a firearm before the police can constitutionally conduct a frisk."); Brinegar v. United
States, 338 U.S. 160, 183 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting) ("if we are to make judicial excep-
tions to the Fourth Amendment for these reasons, it seems to me that they should depend
somewhat upon the gravity of the offense. If we assume, for example, that a child is kid-
napped and the officers throw a roadblock about the neighborhood and searches every outgo-
ing car, it would be a drastic and undiscriminating use of the search. The officers might be
unable to show probable cause for searching any particular car. However, I should candidly
strive hard to sustain such an action, executed fairly and in good faith, because it might be
reasonable to subject travelers to that indignity if it was the only way to save a threatened life
and detect a vicious crime. But I should not strain to sustain such a roadblock and universal
search to salvage a few bottles of bourbon and catch a bootlegger.").
339 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
340 Id. at 172.
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Alan Dershowitz has argued that "the process that an alleged terror-
ist who was planning to kill thousands of people may be due is very
different than the process that an ordinary criminal may be due" and has
even advocated the use of "torture warrants" in extreme circum-
stances. 341 Under clearly established law, torture violates due process. 342
I would also argue that to admit into a trial a statement induced by torture
would be a violation of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on compelled
self-incrimination, under virtually any definition of "compulsion." But
surely Dershowitz is right that the "process due" should take account of
the nature of the crime. And I do not think stomach-pumping would
violate due process in my hypothetical. (Nor would it be possible for
such a procedure to result in a "false confession.") Similarly, I do not
think that Lindh suffered a due process violation in Afghanistan.
Kamisar's suggestions to the contrary 343 may have been more accurate
during the era of the Court's pre-Connelly due process jurisprudence 344
and, in my view, do not adequately account for the fact that Lindh was a
detained during wartime. 345
E. THOUGHTS FOR THE FUTURE
In the Lindh case itself, there was little question that Lindh's confes-
sion was "true." In essence, he acknowledged having joined the
Taliban, 346 an admission that appeared almost self-evident from the cir-
cumstance in which he was discovered. There inevitably will be future
terrorism cases, however, in which the veracity of confessions is doubt-
ful, as with the case of the young Egyptian suspect who, after being in-
341 Interview by Mike Wallace with Alan M. Dershowitz, Harvard Law School Professor
(Transcript, 60 Minutes, Jan. 20, 2002, available at WL 1/20/02 CBS News: 60 Minutes); see
also ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT, RE-
SPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE (2002).
342 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see also Cloud, supra note 55.
343 See Kamisar, More than Miranda, supra note 241, at 51.
344 But see Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (confession held involuntary
where, inter alia, defendant was stripped of clothing and held in that condition for several
hours). The holding of Malinski is not affected by Connelly.
345 It should also be noted that Kamisar's opinion piece was published based upon a
review of Lindh's allegations of his treatment, before the government had responded to those
allegations. Furthermore, even had the Court credited Lindh's allegations, I think it highly
unlikely that the confession would have been suppressed at the district court level. The district
court had consistently ruled against Lindh in pretrial motions, and those rulings largely influ-
enced Lindh's ultimate guilty plea. Had the case gone up on appeal and ultimately to the
Supreme Court, I think the higher courts would have affirmed a district court decision to admit
the confession, despite the existence of such opinions as Mincey and Malinski. While the
Court may well have done so even without the modification to the due process standards
suggested in this article, the confession could be upheld on a more principled basis by explic-
itly recognizing that terrorist cases should be treated differently than others.
346 The content of Lindh's statements is laid out in some detail in Darmer, supra note 10,
at 252.
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terrogated, claimed ownership of a radio that belonged instead to an
American pilot.347
Historically, the Supreme Court was concerned with "reliability" in
assessing confessions under the Due Process Clause. 348 Indeed, the in-
herent unreliability of confessions extracted by brute force is one reason
why such tactics have been held inadmissible. While the Connelly Court
de-emphasized reliability, it did so on facts that involved no efforts by
the police - or, indeed, by anyone - to obtain information. Connelly
literally walked in off the street and told his story. As Laurie Magid has
argued, setting limits on police conduct simply will not help prevent false
confessions of that sort.349 Furthermore, she makes a compelling argu-
ment that until empirical research suggests that false confessions are a
systemic problem, specific limits on tactics such as deception are
unwarranted. 350
Beyond limiting the use of physical force to extract confessions, it is
difficult to establish rules, in advance, on the permissible range of tactics
when seeking confessions. Different suspects react differently to pres-
sure, and crimes involving threats to national security may call for tactics
that would be inappropriate in garden-variety cases. Two groups, how-
ever, emerge as being demonstrably vulnerable to making false confes-
sions - juveniles and the mentally ill.351 In cases involving such
defendants, it seems to me that due process demands that courts scruti-
nize confessions with special care, Connelly's suggestion notwithstand-
ing. And because taking Connelly to its logical conclusion means that an
American court could admit a confession brutally coerced from a suspect
by a foreign agent, the Court should reconsider those aspects of Connelly
suggesting that reliability plays no role in meeting the demands of due
process. Alternatively, the Federal Rules of Evidence should be specifi-
cally amended to make clear that reliability should be considered before
a confession is admitted. 352
In addition, although Connelly may suggest that confessions ex-
tracted by foreign agents using brute force would not be banned by the
347 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
348 See supra Part I.B. But see Colorado v. Connelly, discussed supra Part III.D.
349 See Magid, supra note 56, at 1191 (asserting that there is no empirical proof that
setting limits on police conduct will help prevent false confessions).
350 See id. at 1201-10.
351 Cf id. at 1192 ("[Jluveniles and the mentally impaired ... appear somewhat more
likely than the average suspect to give a false confession"); see also generally Morgan Cloud
et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Sus-
pects, 69 U. CI. L. REV. 495 (2002) (conducting empirical study and concluding that mentally
retarded individuals could not understand the Miranda warnings).
352 To the extent that questionable confessions are admitted into evidence in state courts,
state evidence rules should likewise be modified. Most terrorism cases, however, would likely
end up in federal courts.
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Due Process Clause, such confessions should be deemed a violation of
the Self-Incrimination Clause. When a suspect has truly been compelled
- by any actor exerting force upon him, foreign or domestic - the
introduction of the resulting confessions is a violation of the Fifth
Amendment. The Court's prior failure to analyze truly compelled state-
ments under the Self-Incrimination Clause has led to theoretically un-
sound and constitutionally unprincipled results, whereby compelled
statements may be admitted whereas "unwarned" statements may not be.
CONCLUSION
Cases involving foreign interrogation inevitably will recur. Such
interrogation is limited by both the Self-Incrimination Clause and the
Due Process Clause, the goals of which are closely related. The Miranda
decision presents a flawed analysis of Fifth Amendment "compulsion,"
but the Court's recent Dickerson decision means that courts must con-
tinue to reckon with Miranda. Consistent with the Constitution, how-
ever, the courts can carve out a "foreign interrogation" exception to
Miranda analogous to the "public safety" exception in Quarles. Specifi-
cally, the courts should permit into evidence un-Mirandized statements
made during investigations of terrorism conducted abroad, so long as
such statements were not forcibly extracted. It would be inconsistent
with the Constitution, however, to permit into evidence a confession ex-
tracted by force, regardless of whether compulsion was applied by for-
eign or domestic agents.
Notions of due process, however, are sufficiently flexible to allow
for substantial leeway in questioning terrorism suspects, and conduct that
might "shock the conscience" in other contexts might be tolerable in this
one. 353 The Lindh court never had to resolve the question whether his
statements violated the Due Process Clause; in my view, they did not.
353 Cf. Yale Kamisar, The Importance of Being Guilty, supra note 71, at 184 ("Whether or
not a Justice can intelligently define 'coercive questioning,' I think he would 'know it when he
heard it.'") (citation omitted). Of course, "coercive questioning" under the Due Process
Clause has traditionally been a much broader concept than just conduct that "shocks the con-
science." But see Herman, The Unexplored Relationship (Part II), supra note 22, at 523 (sug-
gesting that plausible reading of Connelly is that only police conduct that shocks the
conscience should be inadmissible under a due process test). Just as the Court appropriately
drew a line in Rochin, however, I think it could appropriately do so in the terrorist interroga-
tion context - just at a different point.
